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MERE COMMON OWNERSHIP  
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
THOMAS A. LAMBERT* 
Abstract: “Common ownership,” also called “horizontal shareholding,” refers to a 
stock investor’s ownership of minority stakes in multiple competing firms. Recent 
empirical studies have purported to show that institutional investors’ common 
ownership reduces competition among commonly owned competitors. “Mere 
common ownership” is horizontal shareholding that is not accompanied by any sort 
of illicit agreement, such as a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, or the holding of a con-
trol-conferring stake. This Article considers the legality of mere common owner-
ship under the U.S. antitrust laws. Prominent antitrust scholars and the leading trea-
tise have concluded that mere common ownership that has the incidental effect of 
lessening market competition may violate both Section 7 of the Clayton Act and 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. This Article, however, demonstrates otherwise. 
Competition-lessening instances of mere common ownership do not violate Section 
7 of the Clayton Act because they fall within its “solely-for-investment” provision, 
which the scholars calling for condemnation have misinterpreted. Mere common 
ownership does not run afoul of Section 1 of the Sherman Act because it lacks the 
sort of agreement (contract, combination, or conspiracy) required for liability under 
that provision. From a social welfare standpoint, these legal outcomes are desirable. 
Condemning mere common ownership under the antitrust laws would likely entail 
significant costs, and the benefits such condemnation would secure are speculative. 
Accordingly, this Article argues courts and enforcers should not stretch the antitrust 
laws to condemn mere common ownership. 
INTRODUCTION 
In contemporary antitrust parlance, “common ownership” (also called “hor-
izontal shareholding”) refers to a stock investor’s ownership of minority stakes 
in competing firms. Common ownership is similar to, but distinct from, “cross 
ownership,” which occurs when one firm owns stock of its competitor or when 
an investor holding a majority interest in one firm also owns stock of a compet-
ing firm.1 Any mutual fund or exchange-traded fund that holds minority shares 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2020, Thomas A. Lambert. All rights reserved. 
 * Wall Family Chair in Corporate Law and Governance, University of Missouri Law School. 
 1 See Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 221, 232 (2018) (distinguishing “cross ownership” and “common ownership”). 
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of competing companies is engaged in common ownership.2 As investment in 
such funds has proliferated, particularly with the soaring popularity of low-cost 
index funds, common ownership has become quite significant. 3 Today, the larg-
est providers of mutual and index funds may each own sizable percentages of 
every major competitor in a market.4 
A number of antitrust scholars have expressed concerns about this devel-
opment. Harvard Law School Professor Einer Elhauge, for example, wrote in the 
Harvard Law Review that “[a]n economic blockbuster has recently been ex-
posed”—namely, “[a] small group of institutions has acquired large sharehold-
ings in horizontal competitors throughout our economy, causing them to com-
pete less vigorously with each other.”5 Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton, 
and E. Glen Weyl (Posner et al.) echoed Professor Elhauge’s worries that com-
mon ownership has anticompetitive effects, writing in the Antitrust Law Journal 
that “the concentration of markets through large institutional investors is the ma-
                                                                                                                           
 2 A mutual fund is an entity that aggregates money from many individuals and invests it in a 
professionally managed portfolio of assets, typically stocks of other companies. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Mutual Funds, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/
investment-products/mutual-funds-and-exchange-traded-funds-etfs [https://perma.cc/KXX9-9RVP]. 
Mutual funds provide investors with instant diversification, which reduces their investment risk. Id. 
Like a mutual fund, an exchange-traded fund (ETF) is a diversified investment pool wherein retail 
investors may purchase shares. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs), 
INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investment-products/exchange-
traded-funds-etfs [https://perma.cc/PGW6-82U8]. But whereas shares in mutual funds are priced once 
a day based on the net asset value of the fund (i.e., assets minus liabilities, divided by the number of 
shares outstanding), shares in ETFs are traded on an exchange at market prices that may differ from 
the net asset value. Id. 
 3 An index fund is a mutual fund or ETF that is invested in the companies included in a stock 
index, which is a pre-determined list of companies designed to represent some sector of the stock 
market or perhaps the economy as a whole (e.g., the S&P 500 Index). See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Index Funds, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investment-
products/index-funds [https://perma.cc/ET7C-YRNF]. The managers of an index fund, unlike those of 
an actively managed mutual fund or ETF, do not exercise discretion in choosing the companies to 
invest in. Id. Accordingly, index funds generally charge lower management fees than do actively 
managed funds. Id. The combination of instant diversification with very low management fees has 
drastically boosted the popularity of index funds. See Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of 
Wall Street, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-
kings-of-wall-street-11568799004 [https://perma.cc/7JMN-D372] (observing that funds tracking 
broad U.S. stock indexes held $4.27 trillion in assets as of August 31, 2019, for the first time surpas-
sing actively managed funds, which then held assets of $4.25 trillion). 
 4 The largest asset managers include Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street Global Advisers, and 
Fidelity Investments which, for example, may own between 2% and 10% of all competitors in a mar-
ket. Mutual Fund Directory | 2020: Top 100 Mutual Fund Companies Ranked by AUM, MUTU-
ALFUNDDIRECTORY.ORG, https://mutualfunddirectory.org [https://perma.cc/A3D4-PQ87] (ranking 
mutual funds by their assets under management) (last updated Aug. 11, 2020). 
 5 Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2016) [hereinafter 
Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding] (expressing concern about the anticompetitive effects of horizontal 
shareholding). 
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jor new antitrust challenge of our time.”6 Other leading antitrust commentators 
have concurred that institutional investors’ common ownership poses a competi-
tive threat and may violate the antitrust laws.7 
Antitrust enforcement agencies have responded to these scholars’ concerns. 
At a March 2016 hearing before a Senate subcommittee, William J. Baer, then-
Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ), announced that enforcers were investigating potential antitrust 
issues stemming from investors’ common ownership of the stock of multiple 
firms competing in concentrated industries.8 In March 2018, Margrethe Vestager, 
European Commissioner of Competition, announced that a similar investigation 
was under way in the European Union.9 And in December 2018, the U.S. Feder-
al Trade Commission (FTC) devoted four panels to common ownership as part 
of its Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the twenty-first cen-
tury.10 
These actions raise questions about when exactly common ownership vio-
lates the antitrust laws. To be sure, common ownership can be a component of a 
scheme that injures competition and runs afoul of antitrust prohibitions. Exam-
ples of common ownership that violate the antitrust laws include: (1) when an 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Eric A. Posner et al., A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 
81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669–70 (2017) [hereinafter Posner et al., Proposal]; see also Eric Posner et 
al., A Monopoly Donald Trump Can Pop, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
12/07/opinion/a-monopoly-donald-trump-can-pop.html [https://perma.cc/YEB6-C2QL] (“The great, 
but mostly unknown, antitrust story of our time is the astonishing rise of the institutional investor . . . 
and the challenge that it poses to market competition.”). 
 7 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, and 
Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement with Professor Elhauge, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 212, 
213 (2016), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/vol129_Baker-2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/27N3-S3CU]; Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and 
Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2027 (2018). 
 8 Barry A. Nigro, Jr., Cross-Ownership by Institutional Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Mar. 31, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/31/cross-ownership-by-
institutional-investors/#1 [https://perma.cc/P8P5-87XB]. Major institutional investors appear to be 
concerned about regulatory interventions to police common ownership. The world’s largest asset 
manager—BlackRock, Inc.—recently disclosed in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
filing that its “business operations, reputation or financial condition” could be “adversely affected” by 
proposed policies to address competition concerns arising from common ownership. BlackRock, Inc., 
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 26 (Feb. 28, 2018). 
 9 See Margrethe Vestager, Comm’r for Competition, European Comm’n, Speech at Studien-
vereinigung Kartellrecht International EU Competition Law Forum: A Market That Works for Con-
sumers (Mar. 12, 2018), https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20191129214816/https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/market-works-consumers_en 
[https://perma.cc/92Q9-QLFH]. 
 10 See FTC Hearing #8: Common Ownership, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.
ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/ftc-hearing-8-competition-consumer-protection-21st-century 
[https://perma.cc/JCM3-3XKQ]. 
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investor facilitates a hub-and-spoke conspiracy11 by helping multiple competing 
firms to collude; (2) when a group of investors that all own stakes in multiple 
competitors agree to pressure those firms to limit competition among them-
selves; and (3) when a single investor with sufficient managerial control in all 
the firms in a market causes each firm to limit competition with its rivals.12 In all 
of these situations, common ownership plus something else that would reduce 
competition, such as an illicit trade-restraining agreement or ownership stakes 
sufficient to confer control, would cause antitrust liability to attach.13 
But what about common ownership simpliciter—that is, horizontal share-
holding without an agreement among investors or portfolio firms and lacking an 
ownership stake sufficient to confer managerial control on a shareholder owning 
stakes in multiple firms within the market? A number of prominent scholars have 
asserted that the federal antitrust laws condemn “mere” common ownership that 
has the incidental effect of reducing competition.14 They say the practice may 
violate both the prohibition in Section 7 of the Clayton Act on stock acquisitions 
that substantially lessen competition in a market15 and the ban in Section 1 of the 
                                                                                                                           
 11 A hub-and-spoke conspiracy, also known as a wheel conspiracy, occurs when “a single mem-
ber or group . . . separately agrees with two or more other members or groups” to engage in unlawful 
activity. Wheel Conspiracy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 12 Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 222 (observing that a per se illegal “‘hub and spoke’ con-
spiracy” would result from portfolio managers “acting as a ‘cartel ringmaster,’ who organized a cartel 
among the competing [portfolio companies] in order to restrict output and increase prices”); see Doug-
las H. Ginsburg & Keith Klovers, Common Sense About Common Ownership, 2 CONCURRENCES 
REV. 1, 3 (2018), https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-2-2018/articles/common-sense-
about-common-ownership-86847-en [https://perma.cc/C9PM-Z6V5] (describing the modern concep-
tion of hub-and-spoke conspiracies). See generally United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 314 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (describing modern hub-and-spoke conspiracies). 
 13 The first and second scenarios—a hub-and-spoke conspiracy and an agreement among com-
mon owners to pursue a lessening of competition among their portfolio firms—would violate Section 
1 of the Sherman Act’s prohibition of contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably 
restrain trade. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). The third scenario, the ownership of control-conferring inter-
ests in competing firms, would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act if such ownership threatened a 
“substantial lessening of competition.” See id. § 18. 
 14 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1204b (4th ed. Cum. Supp. 2020); Elhauge, Horizontal 
Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1302–04; Einer Elhauge, How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our 
Economy—And Why Antitrust Law Can Fix It, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 207, 255–56, 269 (2020) [here-
inafter Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm]; Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 677–78; 
Scott Morton & Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 2033. 
 15 See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1203c (“[S]o-called horizontal sharehold-
ing is reachable under [Section] 7 where the threat to competition is present. This phenomenon occurs 
when a relatively small number of investors, typically institutional, acquire large overlapping interests 
in two or more firms.” (footnote omitted)); Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1302–
04 (contending that mere common ownership may violate 15 U.S.C. § 18); Scott Morton & 
Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 2033–35 (same). 
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Sherman Act on contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably 
restrain trade.16 
This Article demonstrates that mere common ownership by institutional in-
vestors, even if it incidentally contributes to a softening of competition, does not 
violate the U.S. antitrust laws. Mere common ownership does not give rise to 
liability under Section 7 of the Clayton Act because it falls within the provision’s 
“solely-for-investment” exemption, which both Professor Elhauge’s scholarship 
and the leading antitrust treatise have misinterpreted.17 Mere common ownership 
is not illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act because it entails no trade-
restraining contract, combination, or conspiracy.18 As a policy matter, antitrust 
law’s failure to condemn mere common ownership is a good thing, as the mar-
ginal cost of such condemnation would likely exceed the marginal benefit pro-
duced.19 
In developing these points, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets the 
stage by describing the theory as to how mere common ownership may soften 
competition and briefly summarizes the key empirical studies purporting to sup-
port that theory.20 Part II addresses Section 7 of the Clayton Act and shows that 
mere common ownership is exempt from that provision’s ban on stock acquisi-
tions that may substantially lessen competition.21 Part III considers Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act and explains why mere common ownership does not run afoul 
of that provision’s prohibition of trade-restraining contracts, combinations, or 
conspiracies.22 Shifting from law to policy, Part IV concludes by explaining why 
social welfare would likely be reduced if antitrust law did condemn mere com-
mon ownership.23 
I. THE PURPORTED ANTICOMPETITIVE HARMS  
OF COMMON OWNERSHIP 
The scholars sounding alarm bells over common ownership have theorized 
that it softens competition by altering the incentives of corporate managers.24 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See, e.g., Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 269–70 (contending that 
mere common ownership may violate 15 U.S.C. § 1); Scott Morton & Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 
2035–36 (same). 
 17 See discussion infra Part II. 
 18 See discussion infra Part III. 
 19 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 20 See discussion infra Part I. 
 21 See discussion infra Part II. 
 22 See discussion infra Part III. 
 23 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 24 See generally Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1268–70 (arguing that the 
incentive to reduce prices as a means of increasing profits is diminished by common ownership); 
Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 685–86. 
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Most of the time, those managers, responding to their shareholders’ desires, seek 
to maximize the profits of their individual firms—i.e., “own-firm” profits. That 
typically involves growing market share, which entails price and quality compe-
tition from which consumers benefit. Even though a firm’s profits would nor-
mally be greater with collusion than with vigorous competition, the desire to 
maximize own-firm profits usually generates aggressive price and quality com-
petition. When collusion or tacit coordination emerges and drives up prices, firm 
managers know that they could earn even greater profits by slightly underpricing 
their rivals so as to win business, and when one firm cheats in this fashion, oth-
ers tend to follow suit, causing price coordination to unravel and competition to 
reemerge.25 The desire to maximize own-firm profits, then, fosters the sort of 
competition that maximizes consumer surplus. 
Unlike most shareholders, investors holding stock in all the firms in a mar-
ket—i.e., “intra-industry diversified” investors—prefer that each firm’s manag-
ers maximize industry profits, rather than own-firm profits. This influences these 
shareholders’ preferences with regard to how vigorously the firms they are in-
vested in compete. When one firm gains market share, it usurps the sales from 
another firm in which the intra-industry diversified investor also holds a stake. 
And it typically does so by reducing price or spending more to enhance quality, 
so its profit margin on the usurped sale is lower. Intra-industry diversified inves-
tors would thus prefer that firms limit their price and quality competition to gen-
erate the highest industry, rather than own-firm, profits.26 
But why would firm managers defer to intra-industry diversified investors 
over the shareholders who own the bulk of the stock and who would prefer own-
firm profit maximization? The theory is that the largest intra-industry diversified 
investors—the major institutional investors—are better positioned to influence 
management. Relative to individual shareholders, these investors possess more 
extensive monitoring resources and greater expertise on matters of business 
strategy and firm policy. Additionally, they have greater incentive to monitor the 
degree that managers are promoting their interests because they hold larger 
                                                                                                                           
 25 As Professor Einer Elhauge explains: 
In competitive markets where ownership is separate, economic models prove that firms 
have incentives to undercut each others’ prices because the profits they gain from the 
additional sales exceed the price reduction caused by their own conduct. Because each 
firm sets prices based on the same calculus, they keep undercutting each other until they 
drive down prices toward marginal cost, which is the most efficient level. 
Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1269. 
 26 See id. at 1279 (“For such [intra-industry diversified] institutional investors, managers who 
increase individual corporate performance by competing with rivals and taking away market share 
decrease institutional investor profits across the industry by decreasing industry profits. Institutional 
investors are more likely to prefer managers who maximize industry profits by avoiding competi-
tion.”). 
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stakes.27 Their votes are also more likely to attract media attention, which gives 
managers an even greater incentive to secure their favor. Accordingly, corporate 
managers often honor the preferences of institutional investors over those of in-
dividual, uncoordinated stockholders, even when the latter group collectively 
owns a greater proportion of company stock.28 Managers may therefore seek to 
maximize industry profits, which leads them to pull their firms’ competitive 
punches. 
There are strong reasons to question whether intra-industry diversified in-
stitutional investors will systematically prefer maximization of industry rather 
than own-firm profits.29 Similarly, the assertion that corporate managers will 
defer to institutional investors over the shareholders holding the bulk of their 
companies’ stock is open to doubt.30 The primary driver of concerns about com-
mon ownership, however, has not been theory. Instead, it has been empirical 
studies purporting to demonstrate that common ownership reduces competition. 
In the most prominent of those studies, co-authors José Azar, Martin C. 
Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu (Azar et al.) attempted to test whether institutional 
investors’ common ownership of the stock of competing domestic airlines in-
creased airfares.31 To measure common ownership incentives and assess the de-
gree that they changed over time, Azar et al. utilized a metric known as “MHHI 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton, and E. Glen Weyl (Posner et al.) emphasize these dif-
ferences between individual and institutional investors: 
The separation of ownership and control that makes possible very large companies 
leads to managers who are not supervised by a knowledgeable monitor, but only by 
very small individual shareholders who do not have the time, information, or power to 
oversee management. Institutional investors by contrast, could potentially improve on 
this Berle-Means model of the corporation—featuring widely dispersed ownership by 
shareholders with tiny stakes—by supplying informed and incentivized oversight. 
Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 674. 
 28 According to Posner et al., this conclusion: “[F]ollows from a very simple logic: someone must 
determine the firm’s goals. That controller is likely to be one of the largest shareholders. If there are 
no large concentrated shareholders, then the firm will likely be run in the interests of its institutional 
investors even if these do not individually own very large stakes.” Id. at 684–85. 
 29 This premise disregards the fact that intra-industry diversified institutional investors are also 
inter-industry diversified. Their investments in related industries (either vertically related or comple-
mentary) will be adversely affected by supracompetitive pricing in the industry that they are intra-
industry diversified in, so it is not clear that they would prefer industry profit maximization. See 
Thomas A. Lambert & Michael E. Sykuta, The Case for Doing Nothing About Institutional Investors’ 
Common Ownership of Small Stakes in Competing Firms, 13 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 213, 233–35 (2019). 
 30 This premise ignores the fact that firm managers’ personal incentives tend to align with those 
of the bulk of their shareholders in favor of own-firm profit maximization. This is so because (1) most 
corporate managers’ company’s stock compensates them in part, and (2) most desire to usurp business 
from their rivals to burnish their personal reputations for business success. See id. at 235–37. 
 31 José Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1522 (2018) 
[hereinafter Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects]; see also Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 223 
(reviewing empirical evidence that common ownership causes anticompetitive effects). 
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delta” (MHHI∆).32 MHHI∆ is a component of the “modified Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index” (MHHI), which is an adjusted version of the well-known Her-
findahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that the antitrust enforcement agencies use in 
evaluating prospective mergers.33 The MHHI seeks to account for both the con-
centration of the relevant market (HHI) and the degree to which common owner-
ship reduces market participants’ incentives to compete. MHHI∆ is the compo-
nent of MHHI that accounts for reduced competition incentives occasioned by 
common ownership.34 Thus, MHHI is equal to the sum of HHI and MHHI∆. 
The objective of MHHI∆, which is calculated using a complicated formu-
la,35 is to assess the likelihood that managers of firms within an industry, assum-
ing that they seek to maximize their shareholders’ portfolio returns (weighted by 
those shareholders’ control), would cause their firms to cut back on price compe-
tition in an effort to maximize industry rather than own-firm profits.36 The pri-
mary factors determining the magnitude of MHHI∆ are: 
• the amount of voting control intra-industry diversified investors have over 
the managers of their portfolio firms (MHHI∆ grows as intra-industry di-
versified investors have greater voting control); 
• the magnitude of the stakes intra-industry diversified investors hold in the 
firms within the industry, and the degree that each investor’s holdings 
across competing firms are of equal size (the larger the financial stakes held 
by intra-industry diversified shareholders and the more equal those stakes 
across the competing firms, the higher the MHHI∆); 
• the degree that the stock (and thus voting control) of firms within the indus-
try is held by non-intra-industry diversified shareholders (when there is 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1522. 
 33 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1, 
18–19 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L2ZJ-HQLT] (describing how the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated). HHI 
ranges from near zero to 10,000 and is calculated by adding the squares of the market shares of the 
firms competing in a market. Id. It assesses the degree to which a market is concentrated, and thus 
susceptible to collusion or oligopolistic coordination. Id. 
 34 Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1519, 1522. 
 35 The precise formula for “MHHI delta” (MHHI∆) is: 
MHHI∆ = 10,000 ∙ ∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘≠𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 �
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2
𝑖𝑖
�, 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the fraction of shares in firm j controlled by investor i; the shares are both cash flow and 
control shares (so control rights are assumed to be proportionate to the investor’s share of firm prof-
its); and 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 is the market share of firm j. Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1522; 
Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 271–78 (providing a non-technical explanation of the formula 
and detailed instructions for calculating the metric for a particular market). 
 36 See Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 683–84 (explaining the logic of MHHI∆). See 
generally Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 224–25 (describing how MHHI∆ is calculated, its 
variables, and its significance in antitrust). 
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greater control by investors who are not intra-industry diversified and who 
thus prefer own-firm profit maximization, MHHI∆ is reduced); and 
• the market shares of the firms that share common ownership (when their 
market shares are larger, the market effect of firm managers’ decisions to 
pull their competitive punches will be more significant, so MHHI∆ will be 
higher).37 
In their airline study, Azar et al. first figured the MHHI∆ for each domestic 
airline route—each assumed to be a separate market—from 2001 to 2014. They 
then examined each route and market to determine how changes in the MHHI∆ 
over time correlated with changes in airfares on that route.38 After running a 
number of regressions to control for route-specific factors that might influence 
both fares and the MHHI∆,39 they concluded that common ownership of air car-
riers increased airfares from 3% to 7%.40 
A second widely cited common ownership study attempted to assess how 
common ownership has affected service fees and interest rates in local markets 
for bank deposits.41 In that study, co-authors José Azar, Sahil Raina, and Martin 
C. Schmalz considered how the account fees charged by commercial banks, the 
minimum account sizes required to avoid such fees (“fee thresholds”), and the 
interest rates the banks paid on deposits correlated with “generalized HHI” 
(GHHI), a measure that resembles MHHI.42 The authors found that for interest-
bearing checking accounts, a one standard deviation increase in GHHI correlated 
with an increase in fees of about 11% and an increase in fee thresholds of around 
17%.43 For money market accounts, a similar increase in GHHI correlated with a 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 224–25; Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 683–
84. 
 38 Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1526–28. 
 39 Id. at 1528–29. 
 40 Id. at 1559. See generally Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 224–25 (summarizing the José 
Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu (Azar et al.) study’s empirical approach towards anticom-
petitive effects in the airline industry). An instrumental variable analysis by the authors found even 
greater adverse effects. It suggested that common ownership increased airfares between 10% and 
12%. Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1559. 
 41 José Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition 1 (May 4, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710252 [https://perma.cc/MBG4-
M5RC] [hereinafter Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership]; see also Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 
226–27 (summarizing the empirical model used in Azar et al.’s study on common ownership in bank-
ing). 
 42 Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership, supra note 41, at 22–24. The formula for the MHHI, which 
works when there is either common ownership of competing firms by third-parties or cross-ownership 
of some firms by others, must be refined if either (1) there is a mixture of common- and cross-
ownership, or (2) the cross-ownership involves both cross-owned firms holding stakes in each other 
(e.g., firm A owns a stake in firm B, and firm B owns a stake in A). See Elhauge, Horizontal Share-
holding, supra note 5, at 1277 n.48. The GHHI incorporates this necessary refinement. 
 43 Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership, supra note 41, at 26–27. 
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3% increase in fees and a nearly 17% increase in fee thresholds.44 The authors 
also found that increases in GHHI correlated with a reduction in the interest rates 
paid to depositors.45 
Scholars have criticized the airline and banking studies for endogeneity, 
given that MHHI∆ and GHHI turn in part on firms’ market shares and on the 
number of firms participating in a market, both of which are affected by demand 
forces that independently influence market price.46 Replications designed to 
avoid such endogeneity and to correct other asserted methodological errors have 
not found anticompetitive effects from common ownership.47 Professor Elhauge 
counters that these methodological criticisms are unfounded,48 and that the stud-
ies finding no anticompetitive effect are flawed.49 He also points to other, more 
recent studies that purportedly demonstrate anticompetitive effects from com-
mon ownership in the pharmaceutical and seed industries.50 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 23; see also Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 226–27 (summarizing the results of 
Azar et al.’s banking study). 
 46 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 243–44; Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The 
Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: We Know Less Than We Think, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 
732 (2017) (“[T]he key explanatory variable in this research—the modified HHI (MHHI)—depends 
on market shares, which depend on the same underlying factors that drive prices. In econometric 
terms, market shares and the MHHI are endogenous.”). In addition to these endogeneity criticisms, the 
studies are deficient because they purport to correlate market outcomes with institutional investors’ 
incentives, but they never accurately assess what those incentives are. Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 
29, at 238–42. The studies assume that an intra-industry diversified institutional investor must prefer 
maximization of industry rather than own-firm profits, but that is not at all clear. Institutional inves-
tors earn different fees on different funds, and the funds that generate the highest fees tend not to be 
fully intra-industry diversified. Id. at 239–42. If institutional investors prefer to maximize the perfor-
mance of their highest-margin funds, they may well prefer some market outcome other than industry 
profit maximization. Because the common ownership studies have not drilled down to the fund level 
to determine what market outcomes provide the greatest profits to institutional investors, they have 
not properly assessed institutional investors’ preferences, and thus cannot have correlated those pref-
erences with market outcomes, as they claim to have done. 
 47 See Patrick Dennis et al., Common Ownership Does Not Have Anticompetitive Effects in the 
Airline Industry 33 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 15, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3063465 [https://perma.cc/XR78-48F3]; Pauline Kennedy et al., 
The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence 22–
23 (July 26, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3008331 [https://perma.cc/WVV9-TH8E]. 
 48 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 223–25. 
 49 Id. at 225–35. 
 50 Id. at 239–44 (first citing Joseph Gerakos & Jin Xie, Institutional Horizontal Shareholdings and 
Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Mar. 18, 2019) (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 
3285161, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285161 [https://perma.cc/LY98-2RN4]; then citing Melissa 
Newham et al., Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Industry (DIW 
Berlin, Discussion Paper No. 1738, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3194394 [https://perma.cc/9CC9-
DQHF]; and then citing Mohammad Torshizi & Jennifer Clapp, Price Effects of Common Ownership in 
the Seed Sector 33–35 (Apr. 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338485 
[https://perma.cc/ND6B-NLGQ]). Professor Elhauge also cites a cross-market study that found “that 
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I will not attempt to resolve this debate because the central matter this Arti-
cle addresses is not the empirical question of whether mere common ownership 
in fact reduces competition. Instead, the relevant question here is a legal one: 
whether mere common ownership passes muster under the antitrust laws, even if 
it incidentally lessens competition. Based on the theory and evidence described 
above, scholars have argued that mere common ownership may violate both Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Parts II and III con-
sider those two provisions in turn, concluding that mere common ownership of-
fends neither.51 
II. SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which primarily addresses anticompetitive 
business mergers, may also restrict partial stock acquisitions.52 The provision 
states that “[n]o person engaged in commerce . . . shall acquire . . . the whole or 
any part of the stock . . . of another person engaged also in commerce . . . where 
in any line of commerce . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition.”53 Although this text expressly addresses only anticompeti-
tive acquisitions of stock, an investor could not avoid liability by showing that 
none of its discrete purchases of a company’s stock would, standing alone, less-
en competition.54 Allowing acquirers to avoid Section 7’s prohibition by buying 
up stock in a series of transactions, none of which would independently lessen 
competition, would create an obvious loophole that could render the provision 
ineffective. The U.S. Supreme Court has thus concluded that Section 7 forbids 
not merely acquiring, but also holding stock when doing so threatens a “substan-
tial lessening of competition” in a market.55 In light of that understanding, Pro-
fessors Elhauge,56 Scott Morton and Hovenkamp,57 Posner et al.,58 as well as the 
                                                                                                                           
higher levels of horizontal shareholding in consumer goods markets resulted in a statistically signifi-
cant increase in prices.” Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 241 (citing Had-
iye Aslan, Common Ownership, Creative Destruction, and Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Consumers 
8–10 (Sept. 12, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)). 
 51 See discussion infra Part II (arguing that Section 7 of the Clayton Act does not reach common 
ownership); discussion infra Part III (concluding that common ownership does not violate Section 1 
of the Sherman Act). 
 52 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018) (prohibiting stock acquisition when the effect is “substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly”). 
 53 Id. (emphasis added). 
 54 See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 55 See 15 U.S.C. § 18; United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 241 (1975) (observ-
ing that “‘acquisition’ can mean, and in the context of [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act does mean, both 
the purchase of rights in another company and the retention of those rights”). 
 56 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1302–04. 
 57 Scott Morton & Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 2035 (“The practices involved in horizontal 
shareholding generally concern partial stock acquisitions. The same kind of economic theory and 
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Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise have all concluded that Section 7 forbids mere 
common ownership that has the likely effect of reducing competition in a mar-
ket.59 
A potential difficulty for this view is the first sentence of Section 7’s third 
paragraph, which states that “[t]his section shall not apply to persons purchasing 
stock solely for investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to 
bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competi-
tion.”60 By its terms, this solely-for-investment provision would seem to exempt 
investors engaged in mere common ownership—including institutional inves-
tors—from Section 7’s prohibitions. The scholars contending that Section 7 
reaches mere common ownership, however, have advanced two interpretations 
that would prevent the solely-for-investment provision from insulating institu-
tional investors whose horizontal shareholding threatens a “substantial lessening 
of competition.” 
For reasons set forth below, each of those interpretations is flawed.61 Cor-
rectly interpreted, the first sentence of Section 7’s third paragraph exempts mere 
common ownership from Section 7 liability. 
A. The Areeda-Hovenkamp View 
The influential Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise62 takes the position that Section 
7’s solely-for-investment language is not a true exemption from potential liabil-
ity.63 To be a true exemption, there would have to be some stock acquisition or 
continued stock holding that would violate Section 7 except for the fact that the 
investor acquired the stock or held it “solely for investment.” According to the 
treatise, such an acquisition or continued holding is an impossibility. 
                                                                                                                           
evidence (conventionally used in merger analysis) justifies using Section 7 against horizontal share-
holding.”). 
 58 Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 691 (observing that “[t]he most natural solution” to the 
competitive problems posed by common ownership “is to simply enforce Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act”). 
 59 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1203c (“[H]orizontal shareholding is reachable 
under [Section] 7 where the threat to competition is present. This phenomenon occurs when a relative-
ly small number of investors, typically institutional, acquire large overlapping share interests in two or 
more firms.” (footnote omitted)). 
 60 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 61 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 62 Antitrust lawyers and judges so extensively rely on the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise that Justice 
Stephen Breyer once wrote that “most practitioners would prefer to have two paragraphs of Areeda’s 
treatise on their side than three Courts of Appeals or four Supreme Court Justices.” Stephen Breyer, In 
Memoriam: Phillip E. Areeda, 109 HARV. L. REV. 889, 890 (1996). 
 63 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1204a (“[I]s [the solely-for-investment provision] 
truly an ‘exception’ that immunizes an acquisition that the courts would otherwise deem to violate 
[Section] 7? We reach a negative answer . . . .”). 
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Key to the treatise’s position is its view that an investor should be pre-
sumed to intend the likely consequences of its actions. Under this view, no stock 
acquisition that would be likely at the time of purchase to lessen competition 
could be solely for investment, as the investor would be purchasing with an “in-
tent” to secure an anticompetitive outcome.64 Moreover, the continued holding 
of legally purchased shares would cease to be “solely for investment” at the very 
moment such continued holding became likely to lessen competition (so that the 
stockholder was “intending” something beyond investment). The upshot of this 
reasoning is that there can be no stock acquisition or continued stock holding 
that would (1) otherwise violate Section 7’s substantive prohibitions, but (2) be 
insulated from liability because it was solely for investment. As such, the treatise 
concludes, Section 7’s solely-for-investment language creates no actual exemp-
tion or defense. 
The treatise offers three reasons for taking this view.65 First, it says, “per-
mitting anticompetitive investment is directly contrary to the central purpose of 
the Clayton Act.”66 Second, there are a few brief remarks in the legislative histo-
ry suggesting Congress included the solely-for-investment provision to ease 
concerns that the Clayton Act would condemn the ordinary investment practices 
of colleges and banks, and the committee reports in both the House and Senate 
stated that “the exceptions [made in Section 7] are those which are not deemed 
monopolistic and do not tend to restrain trade.”67 Third, as a policy matter, pre-
serving market competition is more important than “protecting particular portfo-
lio diversification,” because “[r]arely is a given investment opportunity uniquely 
advantageous.”68 The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise’s argument is flawed for a 
few reasons. 
                                                                                                                           
 64 The treatise states: 
The “true exception” issue would squarely arise only in an acquisition that is deemed 
both (a) to be solely for investment and (b) to have a probable anticompetitive effect. 
But there could be no such case if the acquirer were presumed to intend the probable 
consequences of its act. In that event, a court’s finding that the acquisition would prob-
ably tend substantially to lessen competition would necessarily mean that the acquirer 
so intended, objectively speaking. Consequently, its acquisition could not be solely for 
investment. 
Id. ¶ 1204b (footnote omitted). 
 65 See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 66 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1204b. 
 67 Id. ¶ 1204b n.8 (first quoting H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, at 17 (1914); then quoting S. REP. NO. 63-
698, at 13 (1913)). 
 68 Id. ¶ 1204b. 
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The obvious problem with the treatise’s interpretation is that it renders the 
solely-for-investment provision a nullity.69 Section 7’s substantive prohibitions, 
set forth in the provision’s first two paragraphs, regulate three things: (1) asset 
acquisitions, (2) full mergers where one entity acquires all the stock of a corpo-
ration, and (3) partial stock acquisitions.70 The solely-for-investment language in 
Section 7’s third paragraph clearly could not apply to asset acquisitions (as it 
refers to “persons purchasing such stock solely for investment”) or to full mer-
gers (because taking all stock entails a transfer of managerial control, so the ac-
quired stock would not be held “solely for investment”). To have any effect 
whatsoever, the provision would have to influence the legality of partial stock 
acquisitions. But under the Areeda-Hovenkamp interpretation, it would not do so 
because any stock acquisition or holding that is illegal under Section 7’s substan-
tive prohibitions (i.e., it is likely to reduce competition substantially) could not 
be “solely for investment” and thus would remain illegal. The legal outcome 
would be exactly the same if the first sentence of Section 7’s third paragraph 
were excised from the statute. 
The treatise maintains that despite the solely-for-investment provision’s le-
gal insignificance, it would still “serv[e] the much more limited function of reas-
suring investors that the Clayton Act was not designed to interfere with general 
investment.”71 But it would do no such thing. The substantive prohibitions of 
Section 7 forbid stock acquisitions only when their effect “may be substantially 
                                                                                                                           
 69 The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise concedes this point. See id. (acknowledging that its interpreta-
tion conflicts with “the general canon of statutory construction that seeks to give significance to each 
statutory provision rather than to make any provision superfluous”). 
 70 The first two paragraphs of Section 7 of the Clayton Act state: 
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, 
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the 
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any 
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
 
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or oth-
er share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in 
any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acqui-
sition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of 
proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly. 
15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 71 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1204b. 
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to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”72 Absent such likely ef-
fect, general investment is not forbidden.73 Investors receive no comfort from an 
additional provision stating that their investment activities will not be illegal un-
less their effect “may be substantially to lessen competition,” for that is implied 
in the substantive liability provisions themselves. Under the Areeda-Hovenkamp 
reading, then, the solely-for-investment provision does nothing; it is pure sur-
plusage. 
The three reasons the treatise asserts for reading the solely-for-investment 
provision out of the statute are unconvincing. First, the fact that anticompetitive 
investment is contrary to the Clayton Act’s central purpose cannot justify simply 
ignoring a statutory exemption. Most of what antitrust regulates is “mixed bag” 
conduct—i.e., business activities that may create both harms and benefits such 
that some instances of the behavior will impose net harms and others net bene-
fits.74 For that reason, antitrust law deliberately tolerates some anticompetitive 
instances of behavior to avoid deterring efficient ones.75 Antitrust doctrine is also 
sensitive to administrative costs and thus sometimes restricts liability for anti-
competitive conduct to keep those costs in check.76 Indeed, much of contempo-
rary antitrust doctrine represents a calculated effort to minimize the sum of so-
cial welfare losses from permitting anticompetitive instances of behavior, deter-
ring procompetitive instances, and administering the rules.77 The Areeda-
Hovenkamp treatise’s willingness to render the solely-for-investment provision 
                                                                                                                           
 72 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Thomas A. Lambert, The Limits of Antitrust in the 21st Century, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 1097, 
1100–02 (2020) (offering examples of antitrust-regulated behaviors that are sometimes output-
reducing and sometimes output-enhancing). 
 75 For example, although it is well-understood that competition may be harmed by so-called “lim-
it” pricing, which occurs when a firm with market power sets its prices above its costs but below the 
profit-maximizing level, so as to deter entry, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTER-
PRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 161–62 (2005), simple discounts are not condemned unless they 
result in below-cost pricing. The law tolerates some potential anticompetitive harm to avoid deterring 
procompetitive pricing. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
223, 229 (1993) (holding that below-cost pricing is required for predatory pricing liability because 
“the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower cost struc-
ture of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical 
ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price 
cutting” (emphasis added)). 
 76 See, e.g., Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 452 (2009) (“Institu-
tional concerns also counsel against recognition of such claims. We have repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of clear rules in antitrust law.”); Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 
(1st Cir. 1990) (“[A]ntitrust courts normally avoid direct price administration, relying on rules and 
remedies . . . that are easier to administer.”). 
 77 See generally Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 871 (2011) (discussing the Roberts Court’s decision-theoretic approach to antitrust and its impli-
cations). 
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surplusage because anticompetitive investment is inconsistent with the central 
purpose that the Clayton Act implicitly embraces the view that any activity that 
threatens competition must be condemned. Such an absolutist position is inap-
propriate in the antitrust arena, especially when (1) the behavior at issue offers 
obvious benefits, and (2) attempts to restrict it would entail large administrative 
costs. For reasons set forth in Part IV, intra-industry diversification by institu-
tional investors is exactly that sort of behavior.78 
Second, the legislative history of the solely-for-investment provision does 
not justify reading it out of the statute, as the Areeda-Hovenkamp interpretation 
would do. As an initial matter, a statute’s enacted text, which here speaks of an 
actual exemption (“[t]his section shall not apply to”), must trump unenacted leg-
islative history.79 Beyond that, it is not at all clear that the legislative history of 
Section 7 supports the view the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise espouses. For ex-
ample, in the debates on the Clayton Act, U.S. Senator George W. Norris re-
marked that “[n]obody wants to prohibit a savings bank or individual or an insti-
tution investing their funds in the stock of corporations, whether they are com-
peting or not, if they do not use that method for controlling the corporations.”80 
Those remarks suggest that Congress intended the solely-for-investment provi-
sion to provide a genuine exemption that would turn not on the incidental com-
petitive effect of acquiring or continuing to hold stock, but on whether the stock 
was being used to control the company at issue. As explained in Section C of 
this Part, a proper interpretation of the solely-for-investment provision is much 
closer to that understanding than to the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise’s view that 
the language has no legal significance.81 
The treatise’s third argument for reading the provision as surplusage is that 
“the public interest in competitive markets far outweighs the private interest in 
protecting particular portfolio diversification” because “[r]arely is a given in-
vestment opportunity uniquely advantageous.”82 But the relative social value of 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See infra notes 242–249 and accompanying text (discussing the high administrative costs of 
MHHI-based lawsuits); infra notes 252–260 and accompanying text (discussing investor benefits from 
low-cost index funds and other intra-industry diversified mutual funds). 
 79 See 15 U.S.C. § 18; e.g., Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. 
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 302 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Constitution gives legal effect to the 
‘Laws’ Congress enacts . . . not the objectives its Members aimed to achieve in voting for them.” 
(citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2)); Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 303 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (explaining that legislative history cannot trump the plain terms of a statute, absent rare 
circumstances); MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating 
that policy “considerations cannot trump the statute’s plain text and structure” in construing Section 
1201(a) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act); Knurr v. Orbital ATK Inc., 276 F. Supp. 3d 527, 
540 (E.D. Va. 2017) (“Legislative history, however, cannot trump plain text.”). 
 80 51 CONG. REC. 14,466 (1914) (statement of Sen. Norris). 
 81 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 82 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1204b. 
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competitive markets versus diversification opportunities for investors is ulti-
mately a legislative judgment. Congress could well have determined that the 
benefits of affording non-controlling shareholders diversification freedom likely 
outweigh any incremental competitive gains from limiting that freedom. Had 
Congress reached that conclusion, it would have included exemption language 
resembling the first sentence of Section 7’s third paragraph. What is more, the 
sort of investment conduct exempted by this Article’s interpretation of the sole-
ly-for-investment provision (set forth in Section C of Part II) is “uniquely advan-
tageous.”83 Part IV explains why that is so.84 
Ultimately, the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise’s interpretation of Section 7’s 
solely-for-investment provision fails because the treatise wrongly equates a like-
ly adverse effect on competition with non-investment intent (i.e., it assumes that 
if a stock purchase would likely impair competition, it could not have been 
“solely for investment”).85 That interpretation is inconsistent with a natural read-
                                                                                                                           
 83 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 84 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 85 See 15 U.S.C. § 18. The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise cites two cases in support of its view that 
a purchase or holding of stock cannot be “solely for investment” if it is likely to cause anticompetitive 
effect. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, ¶ 1204b n.7 (first citing In re Golden Grain Maca-
roni Co., 78 F.T.C. 63, 72 (1971), modified, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972); then citing Gulf & W. In-
dus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 1973)). Professors Fiona Scott 
Morton and Herbert Hovenkamp cite the same two cases in support of their claim that “[t]wo courts of 
appeal agree that the [solely-for-investment] section was meant as little more than an assurance to 
purely passive investors rather than as a limitation on the Clayton Act’s coverage.” Scott Morton & 
Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 2042. The two cited cases, however, hardly justify reading the solely-
for-investment language out of the statute, as the treatise interpretation, endorsed by Professors Scott 
Morton and Hovenkamp, would do. The relevant discussion in In re Golden Grain Macaroni Co. in 
1971, which appeared in the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) administrative decision and was 
never addressed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, concerned an acquisition 
that would “necessarily” reduce competition. 78 F.T.C. at 73 (“[W]hen an acquisition will necessarily 
affect the competitive behavior of the two involved firms, it cannot be said that the sole purpose of the 
acquisition was for investment.”). To say that one must intend a necessary effect of their actions is not 
to imply that they intend the effects that are only likely, particularly if they have no reason to know 
that they are likely. See infra notes 180–185 and accompanying text (observing that the common 
ownership studies find a softening of competition resulting from the industry’s overall pattern of stock 
ownership, which individual investors are typically unaware). In 1973, in Gulf & Western Industries, 
Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit con-
strued a precedent on the solely-for-investment provision as “say[ing] no more than that the court’s 
attention should be focused less on whether the purchase constitutes an ‘investment’ than on whether 
the effect (indeed at this juncture the reasonably likely effect) is substantially to lessen competition.” 
476 F.2d at 693 (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 66 F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1933) 
(per curiam), aff’d by an equally divided court, 291 U.S. 651 (1934)). But that statement was obiter 
dictum, given the court’s conclusion that the record did not reflect investment-only intent. See id. at 
694 (observing that “the record demonstrates . . . that G&W [the investor] will seek to obtain control 
of A&P [the portfolio company] and that it has the potential to attain that goal”). Moreover, the Gulf 
& Western court engaged in no analysis of the statutory text and blatantly misconstrued Pennsylvania 
Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
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ing of the text, which speaks of the purchaser’s purpose in buying the stock, not 
its intent about the stock purchase’s incidental effect on competition. More im-
portantly, the treatise’s interpretation would, for no compelling reason, render 
the solely-for-investment provision superfluous. 
B. Professor Elhauge’s View 
 Professor Elhauge has offered an interpretation of the solely-for-investment 
provision that avoids nullifying the provision but would still exclude intra-
industry diversified institutional investors from its protection.86 That interpreta-
tion, however, reads the exemption too narrowly. It is inconsistent with (1) the 
case law construing the solely-for-investment provision,87 (2) agency regulations 
defining “solely for the purpose of investment,”88 (3) the meaning of investment 
under the federal securities laws,89 and (4) Section 7’s plain text.90 
As Professor Elhauge correctly observes, Section 7’s investment exemption 
includes two elements. First, the stock must have been purchased “solely for 
investment.”91 Second, the stock must not be “us[ed] . . . by voting or otherwise 
to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of com-
petition.”92 The first element is met, Professor Elhauge says, only if the investor 
refrains from voting its shares (or engages in only “mirror voting”93), and other-
wise exercises no influence over corporate managers.94 The second element re-
                                                                                                                           
Circuit interpreted the solely-for-investment provision as creating a genuine exemption, the first ele-
ment turns on the stock investor’s intent in purchasing the stock. See Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 476 F.2d 
at 693–94 (citing Pa. R.R. Co., 66 F.2d at 39–40)). 
 86 As explained below, Professor Elhauge has proposed two interpretations of the solely-for-
investment provision. Both would exclude intra-industry diversified institutional investors from liabil-
ity protection, but only one would avoid rendering the provision superfluous. See infra note 99 and 
accompanying text. This Section discusses only the interpretation that would not nullify the solely-
for-investment provision. The alternative interpretation should be rejected for the same reasons as the 
Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise’s interpretation. 
 87 See infra notes 102–121 and accompanying text. 
 88 See 15 U.S.C. § 18; infra notes 122–132 and accompanying text. 
 89 See infra notes 133–141 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 142–153 and accompanying text. 
 91 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1306. “Mirror voting” is voting one’s 
shares in the proportions wherein all other shares are voted. Doing so ensures that one’s shares are 
counted to establish a quorum, but do not influence the outcome of the vote. Thomas A. DeCapo & 
Kenneth E. Burdon, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Proxy Rules: Considerations for Closed-
End Funds, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.skadden.
com/insights/publications/2019/11/proposed-amendments-to-the-federal-proxy-rules [https://perma.
cc/GL58-PUFX] (defining “mirror vot[ing]” in the context of the SEC’s changes to the federal proxy 
rules in November 2019). 
 94 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1306 (“The solely-for-investment element 
has been found to be met only when the investor committed either to not vote its stock or (in what 
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quires that the investor’s stock ownership not contribute to an actual “lessen[ing] 
of competition” or an attempt to do so.95 The upshot of this interpretation is that, 
if an investor satisfies the first element by committing to pure passivity (no vot-
ing or engagement with management), that commitment changes the showing 
required to establish liability from likely anticompetitive effect to actual or in-
tended anticompetitive harm.96 
Unlike the Areeda-Hovenkamp interpretation, this construal would not ren-
der the solely-for-investment provision superfluous, for it would be possible for 
a stock acquisition to violate the substantive prohibition of Section 7, and yet be 
immunized by the provision. Suppose an investor buying stock in multiple com-
petitors committed not to vote its shares or to attempt to influence the manage-
ment of any of the rival firms. After its purchase, other investors also bought 
shares in multiple firms within the industry, so that the overall pattern of com-
                                                                                                                           
amounts to the same thing) to vote the shares in the same proportion as other shareholders vote, often 
with the additional requirements that the investor not nominate directors, have any representative on 
the board, or exert any other form of influence over management.”); Elhauge, Horizontal Sharehold-
ing Harm, supra note 14, at 256 (asserting that “a stock acquisition can be solely for investment only 
if the investor does not vote or otherwise influence corporate behavior at all”). 
 95 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1308 (observing that even if investors pur-
chased stock solely for investment, “proof that their horizontal shareholdings actually lessened com-
petition . . . would negate the passive investor exception and leave the horizontal shareholders subject 
to challenge under [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act” (footnote omitted)). 
 96 Id. at 1308 (“Whereas an active investment can be condemned if it may substantially lessen 
competition, a passive investment can be condemned only if it actually does so or was intended to do 
so.”). Specifically, this interpretation shifts the standard of liability from “may be substantially to 
lessen competition” (i.e., likely anticompetitive effects) to “bring[ing] about, or attempt[ing] to bring 
about, the substantial lessening of competition” (i.e., actual or intended harm). Id. at 1302, 1309 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18). Professor Elhauge has more recently written that: 
[E]ven if a stock acquisition were solely for investment, that does not really create an 
exception, but rather merely changes the standard of proof from “may” substantially 
lessen competition to instead require evidence that the stock acquisition was intended to 
have anticompetitive effects or actually has or likely would have anticompetitive ef-
fects. 
Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 256. That latter statement requires 
amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that the language “may . . . substantially . . . lessen 
competition” in Section 7’s substantive prohibition means that the acquisition is reasonably likely to 
lessen competition. See 15 U.S.C. § 18; United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 171 
(1964) (observing that requirements for liability under Section 7 “are satisfied when . . . the ‘reasona-
ble likelihood’ of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market is shown”); United 
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957) (“We repeat, that the test of a 
violation of [Section] 7 is whether, at the time of suit, there is a reasonable probability that the acquisi-
tion is likely to result in the condemned restraints.”); see also United States v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 
172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 180 (D.D.C. 2001) (“To establish a [s]ection 7 violation, plaintiff must show that 
a pending acquisition is reasonably likely to cause anticompetitive effects.”). Accordingly, if purchas-
ing stock solely for investment “changes the standard of proof,” it must alter the standard to require 
“actual[]” or “intended . . . anticompetitive effects,” not merely a likelihood of “anticompetitive ef-
fects.” Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 256. 
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mon ownership became likely to soften competition. At that point, the substance 
of Section 7 would be violated by the first investor’s continued common owner-
ship within the industry (as such holding would contribute to a likely “lessening 
of competition”), but the investor’s common ownership would be exempt from 
liability until an anticompetitive effect actually materialized or the investor in-
tended such a reduction in competition. Professor Elhauge’s proffered interpreta-
tion would thus give the solely-for-investment provision a legal effect so that it 
would not be mere surplusage. 
At the same time, the interpretation would not insulate intra-industry diver-
sified institutional investors from damages liability under Section 7. The exemp-
tion’s first element would rarely be satisfied by institutional investors, Professor 
Elhauge explains, because they almost always vote their shares and often engage 
with the management of their portfolio firms.97 Even if an institutional investor 
committed to pure passivity at the time of its purchase, as soon as the pattern of 
common ownership actually resulted in higher prices or reduced quality—the 
moment a plaintiff could claim damages—the investor would lose the exemp-
tion’s protection.98 Professor Elhauge has therefore provided an interpretation of 
the solely-for-investment provision that would afford it legal effect, avoiding 
surplusage, while preventing it from immunizing institutional investors against 
damages liability under Section 7.99 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1306 (observing that “institutional investors 
with a passive investment strategy usually do actively seek to influence corporate management, in-
cluding by direct communication, having investor executives serve on corporate boards, and voting 
their shares to favor positions and management that best advance their investor interests”); Elhauge, 
Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 256 (“[A] stock acquisition can be solely for in-
vestment only if the investor does not vote or otherwise influence corporate behavior at all, which is 
rarely the case for leading horizontal shareholders.”). 
 98 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1308 (“[E]ven if investors who held hori-
zontal stock were purely passive, proof that their horizontal shareholdings actually lessened competi-
tion, such as the Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu study showing that horizontal shareholdings actually raised 
airline prices, would negate the passive investor exception and leave the horizontal shareholders sub-
ject to challenge under [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act.” (citing Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, 
supra note 31, at 1558–59)). 
 99 Professor Elhauge has actually proposed two interpretations of the solely-for-investment provi-
sion. The other interpretation, however, would render the provision a nullity. He writes: 
[F]or investors who are completely passive, proving the substantive standard [of liabil-
ity under Section 7] requires showing that the investors are “using the [purchase of 
stock] by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the sub-
stantial lessening of competition.” I think the better reading of this language is that this 
standard can be met prophylactically if, at the time of the stock acquisitions, it can be 
shown that the purchases of stock were intended to substantially lessen competition or 
foreseeably would have that effect because they lessen competitive incentives. In those 
cases, the investors are using the purchase of stock to bring about, or attempt to bring 
about, a substantial lessening of competition. But one can imagine a narrow reading of 
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There are, however, problems with Professor Elhauge’s interpretation. Alt-
hough he correctly reads Section 7’s “solely for investment” language as provid-
ing an actual exemption if two elements are satisfied, he has misread each of 
those two elements. 
1. Purchasing the Stock Solely for Investment 
First, Professor Elhauge has construed the first element of the exemption—
that the investor “purchas[ed] such stock solely for investment”—too narrowly. 
He contends that “a stock acquisition can be solely for investment only if the 
investor does not vote or otherwise influence corporate behavior at all.”100 He 
further maintains that: 
The solely-for-investment element has been found to be met only 
when the investor committed either to not vote its stock or (in what 
amounts to the same thing) to vote the shares in the same proportion 
as other shareholders vote, often with the additional requirements that 
the investor not nominate directors, have any representative on the 
board, or exert any other form of influence over management.101 
In actuality, neither the cases applying the solely-for-investment provision nor 
agency regulations defining the phrase “solely for the purpose of investment” 
support Professor Elhauge’s strict interpretation of the exemption’s first element. 
No case holds that merely voting one’s shares or making any effort, how-
ever slight, to influence management is inconsistent with purchasing or holding 
stock solely for investment. For example, in United States v. Tracinda Invest-
ment Corp.,102 which Professor Elhauge cites as support for his narrow construal 
of the solely-for-investment element,103 the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California explained that an investor’s purchase of nineteen percent of 
                                                                                                                           
the statute that, for completely passive investors, requires waiting until their stock ac-
quisitions actually have those anticompetitive effects before a challenge can be brought. 
Id. at 1309 (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18). Under the interpretation that Professor El-
hauge refers to as “the better reading,” the likelihood that a stock purchase would lessen competition 
substantially—the trigger for liability under Section 7’s substantive prohibition—would preclude the 
investment exemption from applying. See id. Thus, the solely-for-investment provision would have no 
legal effect because the legal outcome would be the same if the language were excised from the stat-
ute (i.e., with or without the language, stock purchases or holdings that made it likely that competition 
would be lessened would be forbidden, while those that did not do so, would not be). The discussion 
in the text has therefore focused on Professor Elhauge’s “narrow reading,” which would create an 
actual exemption and thus would not render the solely-for-investment language superfluous. See id. 
 100 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 256. 
 101 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1306. 
 102 United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1097–98 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
 103 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1306 n.191. 
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a company’s stock was “solely for investment,” even though the investor, in 
making its purchase, had procured a contractual commitment from the target 
company that its management would consult with the investor’s sole shareholder 
on management restructuring and major financial issues.104 The district court 
held that this commitment to consult with the investor’s principal was not incon-
sistent with a purchase “solely for investment” because the agreement mandating 
consultation provided that “[n]othing in this section shall limit the absolute and 
unfettered discretion of [the target] after such advice and consultation to act on 
such matters in any manner it deems appropriate.”105 But providing advice and 
consultation to a firm’s management involves influencing managers’ decisions 
even if the managers are free to reject the proffered advice.106 Professor El-
hauge’s claim that “a stock acquisition can be solely for investment only if the 
investor does not vote or otherwise influence corporate behavior at all” is thus 
inconsistent with Tracinda.107 
Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co.,108 which Professor Elhauge also cites, does not 
support his view that purchasing stock “solely for investment” precludes voting 
one’s shares.109 In that case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held that the buyer’s planned purchase of 22.6% of a company’s stock 
was solely for investment where the buyer promised not to buy any more of the 
company’s stock, seek representation on its board, or “vot[e] to bring about or 
attempt to bring about a substantial lessening of competition.”110 The investor 
did not promise to refrain from voting entirely or to engage in only mirror vot-
ing; rather, it promised not to vote so as to achieve or attempt a “substantial 
lessening of competition.”111 Thus, Anaconda in no way implies that merely vot-
ing one’s shares negates investment-only intent. 
A third case Professor Elhauge cites in support of his crabbed view of the 
solely-for-investment element is United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. at 1100–01 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18). 
 105 Id. at 1101 (first alteration in original) (first quoting Plaintiff’s Exhibit 262, at p. 5; then quot-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 18). 
 106 Notably, both the president of the portfolio company and one of its board members “testified 
that they w[ould] listen to [the shareholder’s] advice and consultation.” Id. Yet, the U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of California concluded that “the stock acquisition in question was made solely 
for investment purposes and was not made with any intent to take over active managerial control of 
[the portfolio company], or for any purpose other than investment.” Id. 
 107 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 256; see Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 
F. Supp. at 1100–01. 
 108 Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1218–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 109 15 U.S.C. § 18; Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1306 n.191. 
 110 Anaconda Co., 411 F. Supp. at 1217. 
 111 Id. 
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Co.112 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a large block of a company’s 
stock (twenty-three percent) was not purchased “solely for investment.”113 Ac-
cording to Professor Elhauge, “the passive investment exception did not apply 
because the investor tried to influence business decisions” of its portfolio com-
pany.114 The Court’s conclusion, however, did not rest on the mere fact that the 
investor, du Pont, attempted to exert influence at the acquired firm, General Mo-
tors (GM). 
Documents contemporaneous with du Pont’s purchase showed that its ob-
jective in buying GM stock was not simply to earn investment income through 
GM dividends, but also to enhance du Pont’s own sales by convincing GM to 
use du Pont as a supplier.115 The Court explained: 
[B]efore the first block of General Motors stock was acquired, du 
Pont was seeking markets [for various of its products] . . . in demand 
by the automobile companies. In that connection, the trial court ex-
pressly found that “. . . reports and other documents written at or near 
the time of the investment show what du Pont’s representatives were 
well aware [of:] that General Motors was a large consumer of prod-
ucts of the kind offered by du Pont,” and that John J. Raskob, du 
Pont’s treasurer and the principal promoter of the investment, “for 
one, thought that du Pont would ultimately get all that business 
. . . .”116 
Referencing a du Pont Treasurer’s Report that recommended the GM stock pur-
chase, the Court observed that “[t]hat report makes clear that more than just a 
profitable investment was contemplated. A major consideration was that an ex-
panding General Motors would provide a substantial market needed by the bur-
geoning du Pont organization.”117 The Court also pointed to du Pont shareholder 
reports from the time of the purchase. Those reports echoed the point “that the 
purchase [of GM stock] would result in du Pont’s obtaining a new and substan-
tial market” for its own products.118 The Court concluded that “[t]his back-
ground of the acquisition, particularly the plain implications of the contempora-
neous documents, destroys any basis for a conclusion that the purchase was 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1306 n.190 (citing E.I. du Pont Nemours 
& Co., 353 U.S. at 597–606). 
 113 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 602, 607 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18). 
 114 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1306 (citing id. at 597–606). 
 115 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 600–02. 
 116 Id. at 600 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235, 243 
(N.D. Ill. 1954), rev’d, 353 U.S. 586 (1957)). 
 117 Id. at 601. 
 118 Id. at 602. 
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made ‘solely for investment.’”119 Thus, du Pont holds only that stock bought 
with the intent of using it to enhance the buyer’s profits in another line of busi-
ness could not have been purchased “solely for investment.”120 The case does 
not suggest that merely “tr[ying] to influence business decisions” of the firm 
whose stock was purchased is inconsistent with investment-only intent.121 
In addition to lacking support in the case law, Professor Elhauge’s narrow 
construal of the solely-for-investment element is inconsistent with the meaning 
of the phrase “solely for the purpose of investment,” which is used elsewhere in 
the antitrust laws.122 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 
1976—designed, as the title indicates, to improve the implementation of the anti-
trust laws (primarily Section 7 of the Clayton Act)—requires that certain major 
purchases of business interests be reported to the government prior to their con-
summation.123 The Act posits reporting thresholds,124 and it provides some statu-
tory exemptions from its requirements.125 It also authorizes the FTC, with the 
concurrence of DOJ, to define particular terms in the statute126 as well as to cre-
ate certain additional regulatory exemptions for transactions “which are not like-
ly to violate the antitrust laws.”127 Two of the Act’s statutory exemptions apply 
only if the transaction is “solely for the purpose of investment.”128 In addition, 
the FTC has created two regulatory exemptions that similarly turn on whether 
the purchase at issue was “solely for the purpose of investment.”129 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18). 
 121 See Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1306. 
 122 See infra notes 123–139 and accompanying text. 
 123 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (requiring persons 
who plan to acquire “voting securities or assets” of another firm, absent an applicable exemption, to 
file information with the federal antitrust agencies if the value of the acquired assets exceeds $50 
million (in 2004 dollars) and the acquirer and target are sufficiently large). 
 124 Id. § 18a(a) (setting criteria for when reporting is required). 
 125 Id. § 18a(c) (creating exemptions from the reporting requirement). 
 126 Id. § 18a(d)(2)(a) (authorizing the FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) to “define the terms 
used in this section”). 
 127 Id. § 18a(d)(2)(b) (authorizing the FTC and DOJ to “exempt, from the requirements of this 
section, classes of persons, acquisitions, transfers, or transactions which are not likely to violate the 
antitrust laws”). 
 128 Id. § 18a(c)(9) (exempting “acquisitions, solely for the purpose of investment, of voting secu-
rities, if, as a result of such acquisition, the securities acquired or held do not exceed 10 per centum of 
the outstanding voting securities of the issuer”); id. § 18a(c)(11) (exempting “acquisitions, solely for 
the purpose of investment, by any bank, banking association, trust company, investment company, or 
insurance company, of (A) voting securities pursuant to a plan of reorganization or dissolution; or (B) 
assets in the ordinary course of its business”). 
 129 16 C.F.R. § 802.9 (2020) (exempting “[a]n acquisition of voting securities . . . if made solely 
for the purpose of investment and if, as a result of the acquisition, the acquiring person would hold ten 
percent or less of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer, regardless of the dollar value of vot-
ing securities so acquired or held”); id. § 802.64(b) (exempting certain purchases of voting securities 
if “(1) [m]ade directly by an institutional investor; (2) [m]ade in the ordinary course of business; (3) 
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For purposes of implementing these statutory and regulatory exemptions, 
the FTC has exercised its statutory authority to define the phrase “solely for the 
purpose of investment.” It adopted a rule stating that “[v]oting securities are held 
or acquired ‘solely for the purpose of investment’ if the person holding or acquir-
ing such voting securities has no intention of participating in the formulation, 
determination, or direction of the basic business decisions of the issuer.”130 In 
promulgating that rule, the FTC explained that the purpose of the definition was 
to limit the statutory and regulatory exemptions discussed above “to situations in 
which the acquiring person or the holder has no intention of participating in the 
management of the issuer.”131 It expressly rejected the view that merely voting 
one’s shares (or intending to do so) would be inconsistent with purchasing “sole-
ly for the purpose of investment.” It explained: 
[C]omments were invited on the suggestion that this definition be fur-
ther limited by requiring that stock purchased for investment purposes 
not be voted. The comments . . . were unanimously negative, arguing 
that voting for directors, without more, was not inconsistent with in-
vestment purpose. The Commission has decided not to incorporate 
this limitation into the final definition. Therefore, merely voting the 
stock will not be considered evidence of an intent inconsistent with 
investment purpose.132 
If merely voting one’s stock is not inconsistent, for purposes of the statute in-
tended to improve Section 7, with having purchased the stock “solely for the 
purpose of investment,” then it hardly makes sense to say that such voting would 
prevent a stock purchase from being “solely for investment” under Section 7 
itself. 
The understanding of “solely for investment” that emerges from the case 
law and from the definition of a nearly identical phrase elsewhere in the antitrust 
laws—that purchasing “solely for investment” requires the absence of any intent 
to participate in management but does not preclude voting one’s stock or offer-
ing non-binding advice to managers—aligns with the meaning of “investment” 
in the federal securities laws.133 Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
                                                                                                                           
[m]ade solely for the purpose of investment; and (4) [a]s a result of the acquisition the acquiring per-
son would hold fifteen percent or less of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer”). 
 130 Id. § 801.1(i)(1). 
 131 Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 
33,465 (July 30, 1978) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 801–803). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Cf. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. at 1101 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18) (finding that stock 
purchase by a corporation whose sole shareholder had a contractual right to confer with the manage-
ment of a portfolio company was solely for investment because the purchase “was not made with any 
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ties Exchange Act of 1934 define the term “security” to include any “investment 
contract.”134 In 1946, the Supreme Court originally defined “investment con-
tract” in Securities & Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey, Co. to mean “a con-
tract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common 
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a 
third party.”135 The Court has since suggested that the expected profits need not 
be solely from the efforts of others, observing that “the ‘touchstone’ of the 
Howey test ‘is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a 
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or man-
agerial efforts of others.’”136 The ten circuit courts that have addressed the issue 
have unanimously concluded that Howey’s “solely” language is not to be literal-
ly construed and that the crux of the matter is whether the party contributing 
money has meaningful control over the management of the enterprise generating 
profits.137 
Additionally, when applying the test to limited liability company (LLC) in-
terests, which sometimes qualify as investment contracts and sometimes do 
not,138 courts have concluded that merely voting a minority share does not con-
stitute sufficient management control to prevent the interest from being an in-
vestment contract.139 The implication is that voting a non-controlling interest, 
                                                                                                                           
intent to take over active managerial control of [the portfolio company], or for any purpose other than 
investment”). 
 134 Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3, 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). 
 135 SEC v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). 
 136 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 
551, 561 (1979) (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)). 
 137 Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 n.4 (4th Cir. 
1988); SEC v. Prof’l Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 
99, 103 (3d Cir. 1984); Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic 
Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1982); Baurer v. Planning Grp., Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 779 
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir. 1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch 
Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 
914–15 (8th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). The 
remaining circuits have suggested agreement with their sister circuits. See SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 
42, 55 (1st Cir. 2001) (observing that “[t]he courts of appeals have been unanimous in declining to 
give a literal meaning to the word ‘solely’” in the definition of an investment contract, but not reach-
ing the issue because the scheme under consideration involved profits “solely” from the efforts of 
others); SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999) (adopting the For-
man test that omits the strict “solely” requirement (referring to Forman, 421 U.S. at 852)). 
 138 See, e.g., Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 174–75 (4th Cir. 2003) (declining to adopt cate-
gorical rule on whether LLC membership interests are investment contracts, and observing that an-
swer will differ among companies depending on the degree of managerial control possessed by LLC 
members). 
 139 See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 89–91 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that LLC 
membership interests were securities even though members voted); Venezia Amos, LLC v. Favret, 
No. 3:07cv146/MCR, 2008 WL 410163, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2008) (holding that LLC member-
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standing alone, is not the sort of management that transforms the purchase and 
ownership of the interest into something beyond investment. Such understanding 
coheres with the FTC’s rule that voting alone will not prevent shares of stock 
from being held “solely for the purpose of investment” and is inconsistent with 
Professor Elhauge’s view that mere voting will negate investment-only intent for 
purposes of the solely-for-investment provision. 
2. Not Using the Stock to Bring About, or in Attempting to Bring About, the 
Substantial Lessening of Competition 
Professor Elhauge’s reading of the exemption’s second element—the re-
quirement that the investor not “us[e] the [purchased stock] by voting or other-
wise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of 
competition”—is also flawed.140 He says that the requirement is not met, and the 
exemption’s protection is therefore lost, if an investor’s stock purchase contrib-
utes to an actual “lessening of competition.”141 That would mean that, even if an 
investor purchased stock in competing firms “solely for investment,” the inves-
tor could not escape liability under Section 7 if the overall pattern of common 
ownership in the industry came to reduce competition and cause prices to rise. 
Accordingly, economic evidence akin to the airline study could create liability 
for intra-industry diversified investors even if they made each of their stock pur-
chases “solely for investment.”142 
                                                                                                                           
ship interests were securities “[e]ven assuming that [a member] has voting rights and may inspect the 
company’s records”); Burnett v. Rowzee, No. SACV07-641 DOC (ANx), 2007 WL 2809769, at *3–5 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007) (holding that LLC membership interests were securities even though mem-
bers had a right to, and did, oust manager by majority vote); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. 
Co., 991 F. Supp. 6, 7–8 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that LLC membership interests were securities, even 
though members voted on a potential acquisition of another company). 
 140 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1309 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18). 
 141 15 U.S.C. § 18; Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1308 (“Whereas an active 
investment can be condemned if it may substantially lessen competition, a passive investment can be 
condemned only if it actually does so or was intended to do so.”); Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding 
Harm, supra note 14, at 256 (asserting that purchasing stock “solely for investment . . . changes the 
standard of proof from ‘may’ substantially lessen competition to instead require evidence that the 
stock acquisition was intended to have anticompetitive effects or actually has or likely would have 
anticompetitive effects”). As explained above, courts have interpreted the phrase “may be substantial-
ly to lessen competition” in Section 7’s substantive prohibitions to mean “is likely” to lessen competi-
tion substantially, so if purchasing solely for investment changes the standard for liability, it must 
raise it to require actual or intended “lessening of competition.” See 15 U.S.C. § 18; supra note 96 and 
accompanying text. 
 142 15 U.S.C. § 18; Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1308 (“[E]ven if investors 
who held horizontal stock were purely passive, proof that their horizontal shareholdings actually less-
ened competition, such as the Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu study showing that horizontal shareholdings 
actually raised airline prices, would negate the passive investor exception and leave the horizontal 
shareholders subject to challenge under [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act.” (citing Azar et al., Anticom-
petitive Effects, supra note 31, at 1558–59)). 
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This interpretation is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory 
text. The second element of the solely-for-investment provision requires “not 
using” purchased stock “to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the sub-
stantial lessening of competition.”143 Professor Elhauge interprets this language 
to mean not causing a “substantial lessening of competition” with the stock pur-
chase (or intending to do so). But “using” something “to bring about, or in at-
tempting to bring about” some end connotes more than a mere causal relation-
ship between the thing and the end at issue.144 For example, if a driver deliber-
ately drove a car into a pedestrian, we would say the driver “used” the car “to 
bring about” the pedestrian’s injuries. By contrast, if the driver accidentally 
dozed off and steered into a pedestrian, we might say that the car “caused” the 
pedestrian’s injuries, but we would not say the driver “used” the car “to bring 
about” harm to the pedestrian. The verbal formula “use x to bring about y” sig-
nals more than just a causal relationship between x and y; it connotes the inten-
tional availment of x for the purpose of achieving y. 
The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft is instruc-
tive on this point.145 The Court addressed whether Florida’s crime of driving 
under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which included no mens rea element, was 
a “crime of violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16.146 That provision, enacted as 
part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, defined crime of violence 
to include “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threat-
ened use of physical force against the person or property of another.”147 The is-
sue before the Court was “whether state DUI offenses similar to the one in Flori-
da, which either do not have a mens rea component or require only a showing of 
negligence in the operation of a vehicle, qualify as a crime of violence” under 
§ 16.148 The issue required the Court to decide whether negligently or uninten-
tionally causing injury by driving while intoxicated could still involve “the use 
. . . of physical force against the person or property of another” and thereby qual-
ify as a crime of violence under the statute.149 
The petitioner was an immigrant who had been deported for purportedly 
committing a “crime of violence” by causing serious bodily injury by driving 
under the influence of alcohol. He contended that the word “use” entails inten-
                                                                                                                           
 143 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). 
 146 Id. at 6–7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2018)). 
 147 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). The statute also includes in its definition “any other offense that is a felony 
and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Id. § 16(b). 
 148 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 3–4. 
 149 Id. at 6–7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)). 
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tional action.150 The Government argued otherwise, pointing to dictionary defini-
tions, legislation, and even some other Supreme Court decisions suggesting that 
“use” may be inadvertent or negligent.151 In resolving the interpretive dispute, 
the Court explained: 
Whether or not the word “use” alone supplies a mens rea element, the 
parties’ primary focus on that word is too narrow. Particularly when 
interpreting a statute that features as elastic a word as “use,” we con-
strue language in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it. 
The critical aspect of § 16(a) is that a crime of violence is one involv-
ing the “use . . . of physical force against the person or property of 
another.” . . . As we said in a similar context[,] . . . “use” requires ac-
tive employment. While one may, in theory, actively employ some-
thing in an accidental manner, it is much less natural to say that a per-
son actively employs physical force against another person by acci-
dent. Thus, a person would “use . . . physical force against” another 
when pushing him; however, we would not ordinarily say a person 
“use[s] . . . physical force against” another by stumbling and falling 
into him. When interpreting a statute, we must give words their “ordi-
nary or natural” meaning. The key phrase in § 16(a)—the “use . . . of 
physical force against the person or property of another”—most natu-
rally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely acci-
dental conduct. Petitioner’s DUI offense therefore is not a crime of 
violence under § 16(a).152 
The interpretive lesson here is that the word “use” (or a variant thereof) 
may imply intent by the actor and, to decide whether that is the case, one should 
read the word “in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it” and then 
ask whether its most “‘ordinary or natural’ meaning” entails intent.153 When a 
statute refers to “using” something “to bring about” a particular outcome, the 
most “‘ordinary or natural’ meaning” is that the actor actively employs the thing 
with the intent of securing the outcome produced.154 By contrast, the most “ordi-
nary or natural” way to express Professor Elhauge’s interpretation of the second 
element would be to eschew the phrase “not using . . . to bring about” in favor of 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Id. (“Petitioner contends that his conviction did not require the ‘use’ of force against another 
person because the most common employment of the word ‘use’ connotes the intentional availment of 
force, which is not required under the Florida DUI statute.”). 
 151 Id. at 7. 
 152 Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995); then 
quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993); and then quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)). 
 153 Id. (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 228). 
 154 Id. (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 228). 
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language such as “not causing or attempting to cause” “the substantial lessening 
of competition.” Thus, the better reading of the second element of the solely-for-
investment provision as actually enacted is that it forbids actively employing 
one’s stock with the intent of lessening competition substantially. The mere fact 
that one’s stockholding contributes to a “lessening of competition,” if the stock-
holder does not intend that outcome and actively employ the stock to achieve it, 
will not prevent the exemption’s second element from being satisfied. 
C. The Correct Interpretation of the Solely-for-Investment Exemption  
and Its Implications for Mere Common Ownership 
The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise misconstrues the solely-for-investment 
provision because it wrongly equates a likely adverse effect on competition with 
a non-investment purpose by the investor, and that error renders the provision a 
nullity.155 Professor Elhauge correctly recognizes that the provision creates a 
genuine exemption that will apply if two elements are satisfied, but he miscon-
strues each of those elements.156 Properly construed, the solely-for-investment 
provision means the following: 
Section 7’s prohibition on stock acquisitions that may substantially lessen 
competition in a market shall not apply if: (1) the investor purchased its stock 
“solely for investment,” meaning that (a) its only purpose in buying the stock 
was to earn dividends or to profit from the stock’s appreciation in value, not to 
enhance profits from its own business operations,157 and (b) the investor did not 
intend to, or actually, exercise managerial control over the company at issue, 
meaning that it could engage in activities typical of mere investors (for example, 
it could vote a non-controlling percentage of shares or offer non-binding advice 
to managers) but could not possess actual decision-making authority at the com-
pany (for example, it could not hold a management or director position at the 
company or vote a controlling share of the company’s stock);158 and (2) the in-
vestor did not use the purchased stock to bring about, or in attempting to bring 
about, the “substantial lessening of competition,” meaning that it did not (a) ex-
ercise its rights as a shareholder, (b) with the specific intent of lessening compe-
tition.159 
                                                                                                                           
 155 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 156 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 157 See supra notes 112–121 and accompanying text (discussing the du Pont Court’s conclusion 
that stock purchase was not “solely for investment” because the purchaser sought to use its influence 
from investment to boost its own sales). 
 158 See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 159 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. If an investor exercised its stockholder rights with the specif-
ic intent of lessening competition and succeeded in achieving that objective, it would have used the 
stock “to bring about . . . the substantial lessening of competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. If it did not suc-
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Under this correct interpretation of the solely-for-investment provision, 
mere common ownership by an institutional investor will not violate Section 7, 
even if it incidentally contributes to a lessening of market competition. The first 
element of the exemption will be satisfied as long as (1) the institutional investor 
holds a non-controlling share of each company’s stock (so that it is engaged in 
common, not cross-, ownership);160 (2) no agent or affiliate of the institutional 
investor takes a management or directorial position at any of the competing port-
folio companies (as doing so would mean that the investor is engaged in more 
than mere common ownership); and (3) the stock was not purchased to earn non-
investment income (as in du Pont).161 The second element will be satisfied as 
long as the institutional investor does not exercise its shareholder rights (for ex-
ample, voting or offering non-binding advice) with the intent of inducing any 
firm to compete less vigorously. Such intentional efforts to bring about a “lessen-
ing of competition” go beyond mere common ownership. 
Critics may challenge this analysis on two grounds.162 First, they may con-
tend that the first element of the solely-for-investment exemption is not satisfied 
because a large institutional investor exercises de facto managerial control over 
its portfolio firms. The theory of anticompetitive harm from common ownership 
holds that corporate managers pursue the interests of their largest shareholders, 
even when those shareholders own only a small percentage of the company’s 
stock, because the other shareholders are disorganized, poorly informed, and 
consequently less likely to exert voting pressure on managers.163 In the words of 
Posner et al., “someone must determine the firms’ goals. That controller is likely 
to be one of the largest shareholders. If there are no large concentrated share-
holders, then the firm will likely be run in the interests of its institutional inves-
tors even if these do not individually own very large stakes.”164 If an institutional 
investor necessarily exerts control over managerial decision making, then it 
could not have purchased its stock “solely for investment.”165 
It is unlikely, though, that an institutional investor engaged in mere com-
mon ownership actually holds the sway that Posner et al. suppose it does. If the 
                                                                                                                           
ceed in lessening competition, it still would have used the stock “in attempting to bring about[] the 
substantial lessening of competition.” Id. 
 160 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (distinguishing “cross[-]ownership” and “common 
ownership”). 
 161 See supra notes 112–121 and accompanying text (explaining that du Pont’s purchase of GM 
stock was not “solely for investment” because its motivation for purchase was to induce GM to pur-
chase du Pont components). 
 162 See infra notes 163–176 and accompanying text. 
 163 See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 164 Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 684–85. 
 165 Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. at 73 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18) (“[W]hen an acquisi-
tion will necessarily affect the competitive behavior of the two involved firms, it cannot be said that 
the sole purpose of the acquisition was for investment.”). 
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institutional investor has not assumed a management position and owns only the 
percentage typically held by a large mutual fund provider (less than 10% of vot-
ing securities), it can seldom determine the outcome of a shareholder vote. A 
recent analysis of proxy voting at the companies included in the Russell 3000 
Index, a broad-based index comprised of the 3,000 largest U.S. public compa-
nies by market capitalization, revealed that votes are rarely so close that an insti-
tutional investor could alter the outcome by changing its vote.166 In director elec-
tions, fewer than 1% of outcomes would have changed if a 10% shareholder had 
switched its vote, and only 5% would have come out differently if three 10% 
shareholders had changed their votes in the same direction.167 For votes on exec-
utive compensation packages (“say-on-pay”), only 3% of outcomes would have 
changed if a 10% investor switched its vote, and only 13% would have changed 
if three shareholders of that size had done so uniformly.168 For votes related to 
mergers and acquisitions,169 a switch by a 10% shareholder would have altered 
the outcome in only 1% of votes, and a concerted switch by three 10% share-
holders would have changed only 5% of vote outcomes.170 For shareholder pro-
posals, which comprised a mere 2% of ballot items at Russell 3000 firms, insti-
tutional investors could have more sway.171 In 23% of shareholder proposal 
votes, a changed vote by a single 10% investor would have altered the outcome, 
and a uniform vote change by three 10% shareholders could have altered the 
vote outcome in 67% of shareholder proposal votes.172 The data also revealed, 
however, that the major institutional investors often vote differently on share-
holder proposals.173 For example, State Street supported 33% of shareholder 
proposals, while Vanguard voted affirmatively only 15% of the time.174 It does 
not seem, then, that institutional investors vote as a block on shareholder pro-
posals. These data suggest that an institutional investor engaged in mere com-
                                                                                                                           
 166 See BLACKROCK, PROXY VOTING OUTCOMES: BY THE NUMBERS 1 (2019), https://www.
blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/policy-spotlight-proxy-voting-outcomes-by-the-numbers-
april-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7E6-WXC8]. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 2 (observing that “during the 2017–2018 proxy season, 79% of say-on-pay proposals 
were approved with greater than 90% support by all shareholders and 87% were won by margins 
greater than 30%. Only 3% of say-on-pay proposals were won or lost by a margin of 10% or less”). 
 169 The category of mergers and acquisitions-related (“M&A-related”) votes includes both votes 
to approve a merger or acquisition and votes to authorize the financing for such a transaction. Id. 
 170 Id. (observing that “93% of M&A-related votes during the 2017-2018 proxy season received 
90% or more support and only one transaction (1%) was passed within a margin of 10% or less [. . . 
and,] [l]ikewise, less than 5% of transactions passed within a 30% margin”). 
 171 Id. at 3. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
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mon ownership, whose only actual “management” consists of voting its shares, 
will not have de facto managerial control over its portfolio firms. 
Second, critics may contend that the second element of the solely-for-
investment exemption is not satisfied by an institutional investor engaged in 
mere common ownership. They would argue that an investor holding shares in 
competing firms likely lessens competition, as the airline and banking studies 
purportedly reveal, and the investor should be taken to “intend” the likely effects 
of its actions.175 Thus, an institutional investor that receives dividends from 
competing portfolio firms or votes its shares is exercising its shareholder rights 
with the intent of lessening competition and is thus “using . . . [its stock] to bring 
about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition” 
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.176 
Even if one assumes that mere common ownership does have the likely ef-
fect of lessening competition substantially, a point not conceded here,177 there 
are two problems with this reasoning.178 First, it would be improper in this con-
text to presume that the probable effect must have been intended by those caus-
ing it. Presuming that an actor intended the likely effect of the actor’s conduct 
may be appropriate when the actor knows, or at least has reason to know, that the 
effect is indeed likely to follow from those actions.179 But when an actor is not 
privy to the information needed to predict the effect of the actor’s conduct, the 
mere fact that the effect was likely to result from that behavior does not suggest 
that actor intended, when acting, to bring about that effect. That is the situation 
with common ownership. 
The theory that common ownership lessens competition, and the empirical 
studies purporting to support it, assume that corporate managers attempt to max-
imize the control-weighted portfolio returns of their investors.180 In other words, 
a manager considers all the stockholdings of the company’s investors, deter-
                                                                                                                           
 175 This resembles the position taken by the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise. See supra notes 62–68 
and accompanying text. This position is somewhat different because the treatise reasons that likely 
anticompetitive effect prevents a stock purchase from being “solely for investment” (element one of 
the exemption), whereas the claim here is that a likely “lessening of competition” negates the second 
element of the exemption (not exercising one’s stockholder rights with the intent of “lessening compe-
tition”) because a stockholder constructively intends the likely effect of its actions. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 18; supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. 
 176 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 177 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 233–48 (criticizing theory and evidence of anticom-
petitive harm from common ownership). 
 178 See infra notes 179–185 and accompanying text. 
 179 Even this is doubtful. See, e.g., Cominelli v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 589 
F. Supp. 2d 706, 716–17 (W.D. Va. 2008) (“Mere knowledge of a possible result of certain actions, 
without more, cannot constitute an intentional interference.”). 
 180 See O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 46, at 739, 742–43 (explaining logic of MHHI∆, the met-
ric used to assess incentives to reduce competition). 
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mines what competitive strategies would maximize the overall portfolio returns 
of the different investors, weights those potential strategies according to the con-
trol each investor exerts over the manager’s company (i.e., a large shareholder’s 
preferred strategy gets more weight than that preferred by a small shareholder), 
and causes the company to pursue whatever strategy dominates.181 Whether an 
investor’s common ownership is likely to cause a company to pull its competi-
tive punches therefore depends on how that company’s stock is distributed 
among its investors and the composition of those investors’ portfolios. Because 
an investor—even a sophisticated institutional investor—would not know who 
else owns company stock, how much they own, and which other companies they 
are invested in, it would have no reason to know whether its purchase or contin-
ued holding of stock would be likely to cause a “substantial lessening of compe-
tition.” Even if the investor’s purchase or continued holding were likely to lessen 
competition substantially, it would be inappropriate to presume that the inves-
tor—ignorant of the facts that would demonstrate such likelihood—intended that 
probable effect. And absent such intent, the investor could not be “using the 
[stock] . . . to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessen-
ing of competition” and would not lose the protection of the solely-for-
investment provision.182 
A second reason for rejecting, in this context, the presumption that an actor 
intends the likely effects of its actions is that the presumption would render the 
solely-for-investment provision a nullity. Under Section 7’s substantive prohibi-
tions in its first two paragraphs, a stock acquisition or holding that makes a “sub-
stantial lessening of competition” likely triggers liability.183 If “using” connotes 
intentional availment and an investor is taken to intend the likely effects of its 
stockholding, then at the precise moment a “substantial lessening of competi-
tion” becomes probable the investor is “using . . . [its stock] to bring about, or in 
attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition.”184 If that is 
so, then at the very moment liability would be triggered under the substantive 
prohibition of Section 7 (because the investor acquired or held stock when doing 
                                                                                                                           
 181 As economists Daniel P. O’Brien and Keith Waehrer explain, the theory of anticompetitive 
harm from common ownership 
assume[s] that each firm’s manager maximizes a weighted sum of the owners’ financial 
returns, which include the owners’ earnings through their financial interests in other 
firms in the same market. The weight that a manager assigns to each owner’s profit can 
be interpreted as a measure of the degree of control or influence the owner has over 
firm management. 
Id. at 739. 
 182 15 U.S.C. § 18 (emphasis added). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
2948 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2913 
so would be likely to lessen competition), the investor would lose its protection 
under the solely-for-investment exemption (because it would be “using . . . [its 
stock] in [an] attempt[] to bring about . . . [a] “lessening of competition”). And in 
that case, the solely-for-investment exemption is pointless: it could never insu-
late anyone from liability, the legal outcome under Section 7 would be the same 
whether or not the provision was included in the statute, and the provision would 
be mere surplusage. The better view, then, is that “using” stock “to bring about, 
or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition” requires 
an actual, not constructive, intent to reduce competition.185 
III. SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
Recognizing that “doubts have been raised about whether Clayton Act 
[Section] 7 can tackle horizontal shareholding . . . because of the solely-for-
investment exception,”186 Professor Elhauge also contends that “horizonal 
shareholding that has anticompetitive effects can be tackled under the Sherman 
Act as an ongoing contract or combination that restrains competition.”187 The 
basis for liability would be Section 1 of the Sherman Act,188 which is violated 
when (1) the defendant enters a “contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy” (i.e., an agreement); and (2) that agreement unreason-
ably restrains trade.189 Professor Elhauge asserts that if mere common ownership 
softens competition and thereby reduces market output, it unreasonably restrains 
trade. In arguing that mere common ownership entails the requisite “contract, 
combination[,] . . . or conspiracy,” Professor Elhauge offers two theories.190 
A. The Shareholder Contract Theory 
Professor Elhauge first argues that the agreement element of a Section 1 
claim is satisfied by the implicit contract that results from an investor’s stock 
                                                                                                                           
 185 Id. 
 186 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 268. 
 187 Id. 
 188 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal.”). 
 189 Id. Because most contracts involve a literal “restraint of trade,” the U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted Section 1 of the Sherman Act to forbid only those contracts that unreasonably restrain 
trade by reducing overall market output. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (observing that “the Court has never taken a literal approach” to Section 1 
and has “repeated time and again that [Section] 1 outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints” (second 
alteration in original) (first quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); then quoting State 
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997))). 
 190 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
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purchase (the “shareholder contract”).191 In buying a corporation’s stock, an in-
vestor provides the corporation with capital in exchange for a continuing share 
of the corporation’s profits and the right to vote on such key decisions as who 
will direct the company’s business.192 Although Professor Elhauge concedes that 
no individual shareholder contract restrains trade, he maintains that the aggre-
gate effect of all an institutional investor’s shareholder contracts in an industry 
(for example, Vanguard’s shareholder contracts with each separate airline) to-
gether with those of other intra-industry diversified investors (for example, the 
shareholder contracts each airline has with BlackRock, State Street, and Fidelity) 
is to reduce the incentive of firms within the industry to expand output and re-
duce prices, resulting in an unreasonable restraint of trade.193 Professor Elhauge 
maintains that antitrust tribunals regularly aggregate contract effects this way 
when assessing the legality of challenged practices.194 He points specifically to 
exclusive dealing cases, where the legality of a challenged agreement may turn 
on the cumulative foreclosure occasioned by all the exclusive dealing contracts 
in a market, and to resale price maintenance (what Professor Elhauge calls “ver-
tical price-fixing contracts”), where courts consider whether the practice is suffi-
ciently widespread among market participants to facilitate price coordination.195 
There are two problems with this analysis.196 First, the implicit contract be-
tween a shareholder and the corporation wherein it is invested is not a contract 
“in restraint of trade or commerce.”197 The basic shareholder contract does not 
                                                                                                                           
 191 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 269–70. This also seems to be the 
position espoused by Professors Scott Morton and Hovenkamp, who assert that “the ‘agreement’ re-
quirement [of Section 1] applies to the stock acquisition, not to the subsequent use, and is present 
whether or not the interest is controlling. The ‘restraint of trade’ standard does not require control, but 
only that the arrangement serves to reduce output and raise price.” Scott Morton & Hovenkamp, supra 
note 7, at 2035–36. Because a mere acquisition of a non-controlling stock interest would not reduce 
output, raise prices, or otherwise restrain trade, Professors Scott Morton and Hovenkamp must have in 
contemplation not simply the purchase of stock, but the implicit shareholder contract resulting from its 
acquisition. 
 192 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 269 (“The ‘contract’ element is 
clearly met because horizontal shareholding involves formal contracts between corporations and 
common investors. Those contracts are what give horizontal shareholders rights to vote for corporate 
management and a share of corporate profits.”). 
 193 Id. (acknowledging that “each individual shareholder-corporate contract would not, standing 
alone, restrain competition,” but asserting that “[i]t suffices that the horizontal shareholders have con-
tracts with competing firms and that the effect of the voting and profit rights in those contracts is to 
lessen competition between those firms”). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. (“Antitrust has long judged the anticompetitive effects of multiple contracts based on their 
aggregate impact, such as when it judges exclusive dealing contracts based on cumulative foreclosure 
or vertical price-fixing contracts based on whether they are sufficiently widespread to facilitate oli-
gopolistic coordination.”). 
 196 See infra notes 197–210 and accompanying text. 
 197 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
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prevent or discourage any transactions that otherwise would have occurred. Pro-
fessor Elhauge attempts to get around this problem by asserting that a trade re-
straint occurs when all the shareholder contracts of all the investors that are di-
versified within an industry are aggregated. But antitrust law does not aggregate 
the effects of non-trade-restraining contracts to produce a restraint of trade. 
Courts sometimes aggregate the effects of individual trade-restraining con-
tracts—for example, exclusive dealing agreements that restrain one party from 
trading with others,198 resale price maintenance agreements that restrain a party 
from selling a product below a particular price—to determine whether the trade 
restraint a particular contract effects is unreasonable.199 They do not, however, 
aggregate the effects of different parties’ non-trade-restraining contracts to pro-
duce a trade restraint in the first instance. 
More importantly, courts should not treat the basic shareholder contract as a 
Section 1 agreement because doing so would so drastically expand Section 1’s 
reach that it would undermine a basic principle of antitrust law. Professor El-
hauge reasons as follows: (1) ownership of corporate stock involves a contract 
(i.e., the shareholder agrees to provide capital in exchange for a promise of divi-
dends and the right to vote); (2) intra-industry diversified investors’ shareholder 
contracts, taken together, lead corporate managers to reduce output and raise 
prices; (3) therefore, an intra-industry diversified investor’s shareholder con-
tracts with its portfolio firms are contracts that unreasonably restrain trade in 
violation of Section 1.200 
Under this reasoning, every exercise of market power by a for-profit corpo-
ration would violate Section 1. A corporation’s profits, and thus the dividends 
paid to its shareholders, grow when the company exercises market power. Pro-
fessor Elhauge’s Section 1 theory of liability would therefore apply any time a 
corporation exercised market power, because shareholders and corporate manag-
ers would have (1) entered contracts that (2) induced the managers to cut back 
on output to raise profits, and (3) thereby effected an unreasonable restraint of 
trade. For example, any time a brand name prescription drug manufacturer 
charged a supracompetitive price for its patented product in an effort to enhance 
shareholder returns, there would be a contract that unreasonably restrains trade 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv. Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 392, 393, 395 (1953) (find-
ing anticompetitive effects because the exclusive dealing agreements of the four firms produced an 
aggregate foreclosure of 75%); Standard Oil Co. of Ca. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295, 309, 314 
(1949) (upholding a finding of anticompetitive effects for similar agreements among seven leading oil 
producers that resulted in an aggregate foreclosure of 65%). 
 199 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 897 (observing that “[r]esale price 
maintenance should be subject to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers 
adopt the practice”). 
 200 See Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 269–71. 
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and thus a Section 1 violation.201 It is a bedrock principle of antitrust law, 
though, that corporations do not violate the Sherman Act merely by charging 
supracompetitive prices or otherwise exercising their legitimately obtained mar-
ket power.202 
The U.S. Supreme Court has warned against adopting broad interpretations 
of “contract, combination[,] . . . or conspiracy” that would expand Sherman Act 
liability in this fashion.203 In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the 
Court held that there could be no Section 1 agreement between a corporation and 
its wholly owned subsidiary.204 The Court emphasized that a robust agreement 
requirement is necessary to preserve the basic structure of the Sherman Act.205 
The Court observed that Section 1 liability requires something not required for 
liability under Section 2 (an agreement),206 while Section 2 includes an element 
missing from Section 1 (market power).207 The Court then noted that allowing 
Section 1’s agreement element to be satisfied by any technical agreement—for 
example, between a parent and its subsidiary or between multiple officials of a 
single firm—could cause unilateral firm conduct to violate the Sherman Act un-
der Section 1 even if the acting firm lacked market power so that it could not 
                                                                                                                           
 201 Section 1 of the Sherman Act would also be violated any time a corporation withdrew from a 
market, or cut back on product features or services some consumers desire, at shareholder behest. 
Consider the Episcopal Church’s recent campaign to persuade the companies in which it is invested to 
take actions it believes are morally required. See G. Jeffrey MacDonald, Investing for an Impact, THE 
LIVING CHURCH (Nov. 4, 2019), https://livingchurch.org/2019/11/04/investing-for-an-impact/ [https://
perma.cc/J4JH-M2NS]. The denomination purchased stock in gun manufacturers with the hope of 
inducing corporate managers to eliminate design features that may increase the risk of mass shootings. 
Id. A prominent parish also sought to persuade retail giant Wal-Mart to remove assault weapons from 
its shelves. See Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 328–29 (3d Cir. 2015). If 
these Episcopal shareholders succeed in their efforts either by making a shareholder proposal or set-
ting forth a compelling argument at a shareholder meeting, there would be an unreasonable restraint of 
trade (a reduction in market output) occasioned by a shareholder contract. Under Professor Elhauge’s 
view, the ecclesiastical shareholders and the companies responding to their requests would violate 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 202 See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447–48 (2009) (observing 
that “[s]imply possessing monopoly power and charging monopoly prices does not violate [Sherman 
Act Section] 2”); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004) (observing that “[t]he mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of 
monopoly prices, is . . . not unlawful”). 
 203 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 204 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
 205 Id. at 767–71. 
 206 Id. at 768 (“Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in contrast, reaches unreasonable restraints of trade 
effected by a contract, combination[,] . . . or conspiracy between separate entities. It does not reach 
conduct that is wholly unilateral.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1; then 
quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 149, 149 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co., 522 U.S. 3 
(1977))). 
 207 Id. at 767 (“The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful only when it 
threatens actual monopolization.”). 
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violate Section 2.208 The Court reasoned that Section 1’s agreement element 
should not be interpreted so broadly as to disrupt the fundamental structure of 
the Sherman Act.209 By the same token, courts should not interpret “contract, 
combination[,] . . . or conspiracy” in a way that would undermine the long-
standing precept that the mere exercise of market power by a corporation is not 
an antitrust violation.210 
B. The Analogy to Historic Trusts and Holding Companies 
Professor Elhauge also argues that mere common ownership satisfies the 
agreement element of a Section 1 claim because an investor’s ownership of 
stock of competing companies is a “combination” analogous to the historic trusts 
(expressly recognized in Section 1 as qualifying combinations),211 and to illegal 
holding companies.212 With the historic trusts, shareholders of competing com-
panies deposited their shares into a trust, allowing them to be collectively man-
aged by the trustee to maximize industry profits.213 In exchange for their shares, 
shareholders received trust certificates entitling them to a portion of the trust’s 
profits, which were larger because of the reduced competition among firms with-
in the industry.214 With illegal holding companies, shareholders of competing 
firms (the eventual subsidiaries) exchanged their shares for shares of a holding 
company, which could control the subsidiaries and cause them not to compete, 
thereby enhancing their aggregate profits.215 Those profits were then distributed 
to the holding company’s shareholders. According to Professor Elhauge: 
[A]ntitrust treatment of both trusts and holding corporations estab-
lishes that showing a horizontal agreement or combination does not 
require proving a direct agreement between two competing firms, but 
rather can be proven through shareholder contracts between each firm 
and common horizontal shareholders that indirectly link those two 
competing firms. Accordingly, when a common set of institutional in-
vestors are leading shareholders at competing firms, the shareholder 
contracts between those firms and their common horizontal share-
                                                                                                                           
 208 Id. at 770–77. 
 209 Id. at 775 (observing that Congress imposed different requirements for liability under Sections 
1 and 2 for “eminently sound reasons” and that “[s]ubjecting a single firm’s every action to judicial 
scrutiny for reasonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the antitrust 
laws seek to promote”). 
 210 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 211 15 U.S.C. § 1 (forbidding every unreasonable “combination in the form of trust or otherwise”). 
 212 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 269–72. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 269–71. 
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holders also satisfy the contract or combination requirement of Sher-
man Act [Section] 1.216 
This attempt to analogize mere common ownership to the historic trusts 
and illegal holding companies fails for two reasons. First, both the historic trusts 
and the holding companies that violated Section 1 involved a combination of 
controlling interests in competing firms. With the trusts, the trustee held all or 
nearly all of the stock of participating firms and thus combined control of each 
of them within a single entity.217 Similarly, the creation of holding companies 
was condemned under Section 1 when the parent company took a majority inter-
est in multiple competing subsidiaries and thereby gained the ability to control 
them in a way that would lessen market competition.218 Combining control of 
multiple competing firms into a single entity “deprives the marketplace of the 
independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and de-
mands.”219 But mere common ownership (as opposed to cross-ownership) in-
volves an investor’s combining of only non-controlling interests in competing 
firms.220 Accordingly, it does not reduce the number of “independent centers of 
decisionmaking” in a market the way the historic trusts and illegal holding com-
panies did.221 
                                                                                                                           
 216 Id. at 270. 
 217 See Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2279, 2316 (2013) (observing that “[t]he 1882 Standard Oil Trust, which became the model for other 
trusts . . . was joined by all of the stockholders and members of fourteen corporations and limited 
partnerships, the controlling stockholders and members of an additional twenty-six corporations and 
limited partnerships, and forty-six individuals” (footnote omitted)). 
 218 See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 322 (1904) (explaining that the condemned 
holding company had taken “the capital stock, or a controlling interest in the capital stock, of each of 
the constituent railway companies”). The Supreme Court also observed that the condemned holding 
company “ha[d] become the holder—more properly speaking, the custodian—of more than nine-
tenths of the stock of the Northern Pacific, and more than three-fourths of the stock of the Great 
Northern” railroads. Id. at 326. Professor Elhauge cites this case to support his position. See Elhauge, 
Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 270 n.310 (citing id. 325–27). 
 219 Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 769. 
 220 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 221 Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 769. In 1984, in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp., the Court emphasized that: 
[I]n any [Section 1] conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own 
interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only 
reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increas-
es the economic power moving in one particular direction. 
Id. Combining the non-controlling interests of two companies, by contrast, does not preclude those 
companies from “pursu[ing] their own interests separately,” entail their “combining to act as one for 
their common benefit,” “reduce[] the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed,” or “in-
crease[] the economic power moving in one particular direction.” Id. 
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Professor Elhauge’s analogies also fail because the historic trusts and ille-
gal holding companies, unlike mere common ownership, involved agreements 
beyond the basic shareholder contract.222 With the historic trusts, the constituent 
firms themselves agreed to consolidate using the trust form. As Wayne D. Col-
lins has documented, the firms adopted the trust as their means of combination 
because the common law at the time would have enforced neither an inter-firm 
contract to limit competition223 nor a pooling agreement between the competing 
firms,224 and the firms could not simply adopt a unitary ownership structure (for 
example, some kind of holding corporation) because prevailing corporation law 
restricted the corporate form in ways that made it unworkable as a combination 
structure.225 In addition to these inter-firm agreements, the trusts involved 
agreements between the shareholders of participant firms: each firm’s share-
holders agreed to deposit their shares into the trust on the condition that the 
shareholders of competing firms did the same so that the combined stock could 
be managed to encourage industry profit maximization.226 Professor Elhauge is 
thus wrong when he writes that “the only thing combining the firms [in the his-
toric trusts was] the fact that their shareholder rights [were] held by a common 
horizontal investor, namely the trust.”227 In fact, firms participating in the trusts 
were combined by agreements among themselves and among their shareholders. 
Holding companies that have been deemed illegal combinations under Sec-
tion 1 have also involved agreements between the shareholders of different port-
folio firms. In the holding company condemned in Northern Securities, Co. v. 
United States, for example, the stockholders of the portfolio railroads collaborat-
ed with each other in concocting a scheme to enhance their collective returns.228 
                                                                                                                           
 222 As explained above, the implicit contract between a stockholder and the company that it is 
invested in (i.e., the shareholder’s provision of capital in exchange for the promise of dividends and a 
limited voting right) does not count as a “contract, combination[,] . . . or conspiracy” for purposes of 
Section 1. 15 U.S.C. § 1; see supra notes 192–210 and accompanying text. 
 223 Collins, supra note 217, at 2293–2307. 
 224 Id. at 2307–09. 
 225 Id. at 2309–15. 
 226 Id. at 2316 (observing that “[t]he 1882 agreement [creating the Standard Oil trust] was joined 
by all of the stockholders and members of fourteen corporations and limited partnerships, the control-
ling stockholders and members of an additional twenty-six corporations and limited partnerships, and 
forty-six individuals, all of whom would be the beneficiaries of the trust”). 
 227 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 270. Professor Elhauge is also 
wrong in stating that “antitrust treatment of . . . trusts . . . establishes that showing a horizontal agree-
ment or combination does not require proving a direct agreement between two competing firms.” Id. 
There were agreements between the rival firms in the trusts. 
 228 N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 326. The Court explained: 
[I]t is indisputable upon this record that . . . the stockholders of the Great Northern and 
Northern Pacific Railway corporations, having competing and substantially parallel 
lines[,] . . . combined and conceived the scheme of organizing a corporation under the 
laws of New Jersey, which should hold the shares of the stock of the constituent com-
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With mere common ownership, there are no agreements between the com-
peting portfolio firms (as with the historic trusts) or between the shareholders of 
different competing firms (as with both the trusts and the holding companies 
whose creation violated Section 1). Take, for example, the airline industry. Even 
if institutional investors’ common ownership of airlines has lessened market 
competition (a point not conceded here),229 there is no evidence that the airlines 
have agreed to act in concert or to pursue a common ownership structure (as the 
firms in the historic trusts did), or that the institutional investors holding stock in 
multiple airlines have agreed to press the companies to reduce competition 
among themselves (as did the shareholders of firms in the trusts and in illegal 
holding companies). The only “agreements” among the individuals and entities 
in the airline industry are the basic shareholder agreements between investors 
and each of their portfolio firms, which, for reasons set forth above, are not cog-
nizable Section 1 agreements.230 Rather, they are intra-enterprise agreements 
between capital providers and managers. 
Proponents of imposing Section 1 liability on the basis of mere common 
ownership may respond that, even when intra-industry diversified institutional 
investors do not hold controlling shares of their portfolio firms, they still exer-
cise de facto control over those firms because firm managers defer to the inter-
ests of their largest shareholders, all of which are intra-industry diversified.231 
Thus, common ownership results in a combination of effective controlling inter-
ests in competing companies, just as the historic trusts and illegal holding com-
panies combined controlling stakes of separate rivals. 
The problem with this reasoning is that mere common ownership does not 
amalgamate de facto controlling interests within any single entity or group of 
collaborating entities. No single institutional investor combines de facto control-
ling interests, for the common ownership literature asserts that a softening of 
                                                                                                                           
panies, such shareholders, in lieu of their shares in those companies, to receive, upon an 
agreed basis of value, shares in the holding corporation; that pursuant to such combina-
tion the Northern Securities Company was organized as the holding corporation 
through which the scheme should be executed; and under that scheme such holding 
corporation has become the holder—more properly speaking, the custodian—of more 
than nine-tenths of the stock of the Northern Pacific, and more than three-fourths of the 
stock of the Great Northern, the stockholders of the companies who delivered their 
stock receiving upon the agreed basis shares of stock in the holding corporation. 
Id. (first and third emphasis added). 
 229 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 233–48 (criticizing the theory and evidence of anti-
competitive harm from common ownership). 
 230 See supra Part III.A. and accompanying text. 
 231 See, e.g., Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 684–85 (“[S]omeone must determine the 
firms’ goals. That controller is likely to be one of the largest shareholders. If there are no large con-
centrated shareholders, then the firm will likely be run in the interests of its institutional investors 
even if these do not individually own very large stakes.”). 
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competition results from the overall pattern of stock ownership among all the 
investors in the industry—for example, from the fact that multiple large inves-
tors are intra-industry diversified and there are no shareholders holding large 
blocks of single firms within the industry.232 It is no answer to say that intra-
industry diversified institutional investors as a group have combined de facto 
controlling interests because there is no evidence of any agreement among insti-
tutional investors to work together as a group in managing the stock that they 
collectively own.233 
Proponents of Section 1 liability may retort that the absence of any such 
agreement is inconsequential because intra-industry diversified institutional in-
vestors act in parallel to pursue industry profit maximization and a lessening of 
market competition. But it is well-established in antitrust law that mere parallel 
conduct cannot establish an agreement for purposes of Section 1 when each in-
dividual firm has an incentive to act as it does, regardless of what the other firms 
do.234 This principle would apply to intra-industry diversified institutional inves-
tors. Parallel conduct cannot establish a Section 1 agreement absent a “conscious 
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objec-
tive.”235 There is no evidence that institutional investors have consciously com-
mitted to act in concert in causing their portfolio firms to pursue industry profit 
maximization. Accordingly, there is no “group” of institutional investors who 
have collectively combined de facto controlling interests in competing firms. 
                                                                                                                           
 232 See id. at 683–84 (explaining logic of MHHI∆, which purports to measure competition-
lessening incentives resulting from overall pattern of ownership in an industry). Even with significant 
common ownership by multiple investors, the holding of large blocks by investors who are not intra-
industry diversified will, according to the theory, prevent competition-softening. Id. at 684 (discussing 
effect of blockholders). 
 233 Professor Elhauge appears to have in mind a combination of interests within such a group of 
shareholders when he writes that “a horizontal agreement or combination . . . can be proven through 
shareholder contracts between each firm and common horizontal shareholders that indirectly link 
those . . . competing firms.” Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding Harm, supra note 14, at 270 (emphasis 
added). He further asserts that “when a common set of institutional investors are leading shareholders 
at competing firms, the shareholder contracts between those firms and their common horizontal share-
holders also satisfy the contract or combination requirement of Sherman Act [Section] 1.” Id. (empha-
sis added). 
 234 Compare Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 542–43 (1954) 
(holding that the parallel conduct did not establish agreement where each firm had independent incen-
tive to act as it did, regardless of competitors’ actions), with Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 
306 U.S. 208, 221–27 (1939) (holding that the agreement could be inferred from consciously parallel 
conduct that would have been economically irrational if engaged in unilaterally). 
 235 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quoting Edward J. 
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
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IV. WHY ANTITRUST CONDEMNATION OF MERE COMMON OWNERSHIP 
WOULD LIKELY REDUCE SOCIAL WELFARE 
Thus far, this Article’s analysis has been legal and descriptive: it has shown 
why neither Section 7 of the Clayton Act nor Section 1 of the Sherman Act con-
demn mere common ownership. Next, this Article considers why, as a normative 
matter, that is a good thing. In short, those who call for condemning mere com-
mon ownership under the antitrust laws have not shown that the marginal bene-
fits of such condemnation are likely to exceed the marginal costs it would entail. 
Courts and enforcers should thus refrain, at least on the current record, from 
adopting aggressive interpretations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 
of the Sherman Act to preclude mere common ownership. 
The marginal benefit of condemning mere common ownership would be 
the elimination of anticompetitive harms (i.e., allocative inefficiencies from su-
pracompetitive pricing) that result from the practice. On the current record, we 
have no idea of the magnitude of those harms and thus of the benefit of eliminat-
ing them. To be sure, the studies purporting to show harms from common own-
ership have estimated adverse price effects of the practice. The airline study, for 
example, concluded that airfares are 3% to 7% higher because of current levels 
of common ownership.236 Likewise, the banking study found that a one standard 
deviation increase in the common ownership metric raised fees on interest-
bearing checking accounts by 11% and increased the minimum balance required 
to avoid fees by 17%.237 The trustworthiness of those studies, however, is a mat-
ter of dispute as they have been criticized on methodological grounds,238 and 
other studies have reached contrary conclusions.239 
More importantly for our purposes, the studies have not attempted to quan-
tify the adverse effects of mere common ownership, and they therefore tell us 
nothing about the marginal benefit of expanding the scope of the antitrust laws to 
condemn it. As explained above, the studies that purport to show harm from hor-
izontal shareholding correlate some measure of common ownership of the firms 
in a market—MHHI∆ or a variant thereof—with price effects in that market.240 
In so doing, the studies have lumped together all instances of common owner-
ship: those accompanied by anticompetitive agreements (for example, hub-and-
spoke conspiracies, collaborations among common investors to encourage indus-
try profit maximization), and those where no such agreements are present. This 
is understandable, as it would be extremely difficult for researchers to know 
                                                                                                                           
 236 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 237 See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
 238 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 239 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 240 See supra notes 31–45 and accompanying text. 
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when common ownership involved additional anticompetitive agreements and 
when it did not. But the failure to segregate instances of mere common owner-
ship from “common ownership plus anticompetitive agreement” implies that the 
common ownership studies cannot give a sense of the added social benefit that 
would result from policing the former. It could be that most of the alleged wel-
fare loss from common ownership could be eliminated simply by stepping up 
enforcement against anticompetitive agreements that may emerge when there is 
substantial common ownership of firms in concentrated industries. If that is the 
case, the marginal benefits of expanding antitrust to condemn mere common 
ownership could be small. 
In any event, the efficiency gain from eliminating the slight price increases 
allegedly shown to result from common ownership is the upper limit of the po-
tential marginal benefit from condemning mere common ownership. If critics are 
correct that the common ownership studies have overstated the social harms of 
horizontal shareholding, or if such harms could be reduced by simply stepping 
up enforcement against actual anticompetitive agreements (common ownership 
“plus”), then the marginal benefits of condemning mere common ownership will 
be less than the quantum of harm purportedly demonstrated by the common 
ownership studies. 
Although it is unclear whether condemning mere common ownership 
would secure significant marginal benefits, it would almost certainly entail sub-
stantial marginal costs. Assuming that institutional investors continue to hold 
stocks of multiple firms competing in concentrated markets, there would be the 
costs of deciding whether an instance of common ownership violates the law. 
Such “decision costs” would be borne by enforcers in deciding whether to chal-
lenge instances of common ownership, by adjudicators in determining whether 
to assign liability, and by business planners in determining whether the conduct 
under consideration is legally permitted. For all three groups, the decision costs 
of a rule condemning mere common ownership would be significant. 
To see why, consider the likely circumstances wherein mere common own-
ership would be condemned. Because many instances of the practice entail no 
competitive threat, per se condemnation would be inappropriate,241 and antitrust 
liability would presumably attach only where product market concentration and 
the overall pattern of ownership of the stock of firms participating in the market 
indicate that anticompetitive harm is plausible.242 Professor Elhauge has pro-
                                                                                                                           
 241 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (“Resort to 
per se rules is confined to restraints, like those mentioned, ‘that would always or almost always tend 
to restrict competition and decrease output.’” (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 
U.S. 717, 723 (1988))). 
 242 In unconcentrated, highly competitive markets, horizontal shareholding would be unlikely to 
occasion anticompetitive harm. And, even in concentrated product markets, larger investments by 
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posed to implement such a screen using MHHI.243 Specifically, he contends that 
the federal antitrust agencies “should investigate any horizontal stock acquisi-
tions that have created, or would create, a MHHI∆ of over 200 in a market with 
an MHHI over 2500, in order to determine whether those horizontal stock acqui-
sitions raised prices or are likely to do so.”244 Liability would thus result where 
(1) common ownership has led to MHHI and MHHI∆ levels in excess of 2500 
and 200, respectively; and (2) there are indications that common ownership has 
had, or threatens, an adverse price effect in the market. 
The decision costs facing enforcers and adjudicators under this approach 
would be substantial.245 To determine whether the MHHI-based thresholds were 
met, they would have to define the markets where firms with common share-
holders compete and calculate MHHI and MHHI∆ for each. If the thresholds 
were exceeded, they would have to assess complicated econometric evidence 
and resolve inevitable battles among experts to determine whether and to what 
extent common ownership had raised or was likely to raise prices. Adjudicators 
would then confront the difficult matter of allocating liability among the inves-
tors holding stakes in multiple firms competing in the market. One approach 
would be to assign liability only to those intra-industry diversified investors that 
could substantially reduce MHHI∆ by divesting from the market. Such an ap-
proach often would not work, however, for in many situations each individual 
investor’s unilateral divestment would reduce MHHI∆ by only a slight 
amount.246 An alternative approach would be to impose joint liability on all in-
vestors holding stakes in multiple firms within the market. It is likely, though, 
that the investor(s) from whom a plaintiff actually collected would seek contri-
bution from other intra-industry diversified investors, and it would seem inequi-
table not to permit such actions. In the end, then, courts would have to find some 
way to address the intractable question of how to allocate any economic harm 
from common ownership among investors holding stakes in multiple competi-
tors within the market. 
                                                                                                                           
undiversified blockholders (who have an interest in own-firm profit maximization) would tend to 
preclude anticompetitive harm resulting from smaller holdings by intra-industry diversified investors. 
See Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 684 (explaining how presence of single-firm blockholders 
reduces managers’ incentives to lessen competition). 
 243 Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 5, at 1303. 
 244 Id. Professor Elhauge would also allow private treble damages actions when those require-
ments are met. For example, “[a] class of passengers injured by paying higher airline fares because of 
horizontal shareholdings on a concentrated route could . . . bring suit on the theory that the stock ac-
quisitions by institutional investors that created those horizontal shareholdings harmed the passengers 
by lessening airline competition.” Id. at 1304. 
 245 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 250–53 (detailing the decision costs for adjudicators 
and enforcers in MHHI∆-based lawsuits). 
 246 See Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 692–93 (offering an example to illustrate that 
unilateral divestment may have little effect on MHHI∆). 
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As great as the decision costs would be for enforcers and adjudicators, 
those facing business planners would be larger still.247 Given that no single insti-
tutional investor could prevent the adverse price effects that would satisfy the 
second element of Professor Elhauge’s liability test, institutional investors could 
protect themselves from liability only by negating the first, which would require 
them to refrain from common ownership in markets where MHHI and MHHI∆ 
exceed certain levels. That would require business planners to calculate and con-
tinually monitor MHHI and MHHI∆ in every market where their institutions 
held stock of multiple competitors. Because both metrics are influenced by (1) 
the market shares of the firms sharing common owners, (2) the ownership per-
centages of the firms’ common shareholders, and (3) the ownership stakes of the 
firms’ non-diversified shareholders, an institutional investor holding shares of 
competing firms could find itself at risk of antitrust liability if the market shares 
of its portfolio firms rose, if other intra-industry diversified investors adjusted 
their holdings of firms within the industry, or if major non-diversified sharehold-
ers decreased their ownership stakes.248 Planners for an institutional investor 
holding stakes in competing firms would therefore have to recalculate MHHI 
and MHHI∆ on a near daily basis to ensure that the investor’s stockholding—the 
one thing the investor can control—could not be deemed to have contributed to a 
softening of competition. 
Of course, institutional investors could avoid these decision costs if they 
simply refrained from holding shares of multiple firms competing in concentrat-
ed markets.249 That appears to be the outcome that Professor Elhauge and other 
common ownership critics seek to encourage with their proposals to impose anti-
trust liability based on mere common ownership.250 But, if institutional investors 
were to take that tack, retail investors would lose access to many of the diversi-
fied investment opportunities that create value for them.251 
Most obviously, driving institutional investors to refrain from intra-industry 
diversification would eliminate true index funds. Nearly all significant stock in-
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dexes include more than one firm from some concentrated industry, so fund 
managers could not simply invest in all the firms included in an index. Although 
they could select one indexed firm from each concentrated industry, any fund 
that was so managed would not be a true index fund; a hallmark of such a fund is 
the absence of manager discretion, resulting in lower management fees.252 
Inducing each institutional investor to hold stock in only one firm per con-
centrated industry would also reduce the variety of actively managed mutual 
funds that retail investors could select.253 Common ownership critics maintain 
that intra-industry diversification at the institutional investor level—not just at 
the individual fund level—leads to softened competition in concentrated mar-
kets.254 That implies that institutional investors could not avoid liability for 
common ownership merely by ensuring that each of their individual funds held 
stock in only one firm competing in a concentrated industry. Each institutional 
investor would instead have to select only one company per concentrated indus-
try for all of its individual funds. Thus, institutional investors could not offer a 
diverse range of actively managed mutual funds featuring different investment 
strategies such growth, income, or value. As an example, if Southwest Airlines 
was a growth stock and United Airlines a value stock,255 an institutional investor 
would be unable to offer a growth fund featuring Southwest and a value fund 
featuring United. 
Eschewing intra-industry diversification would also make it impossible for 
institutional investors to design funds that bet on an industry as a whole but lim-
ited fund investors’ exposure to company-specific risks within that industry.256 
Imagine, for example, a financial crisis that led to a sharp, across-the-board de-
cline in the stock prices of commercial banks. A retail investor might believe that 
the commercial banking sector as a whole would rebound but that some individ-
ual banks would likely fail. That investor would want to invest in commercial 
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banking generally but to limit risk by holding a diversified portfolio within the 
sector. If institutional investors were induced to hold only one stock per industry, 
they could not offer the sort of fund this retail investor would prefer. 
The welfare squandered by eliminating these sorts of value-creating in-
vestment opportunities would constitute “error costs”—i.e., losses that result 
from discouraging welfare-enhancing practices in the quest to preclude welfare-
reducing ones.257 Other error costs would emerge if institutional investors sought 
to avoid antitrust liability by remaining entirely passive—not voting their shares, 
engaging with management, or threatening to sell their shares—at the firms 
where they are invested. They might take such a tack so that they could claim 
they had no influence over their portfolio firms, and thus could not have contrib-
uted to any softening of competition.258 But, such passivity by institutional in-
vestors creates its own costs: empirical evidence shows that long-term institu-
tional investors tend to reduce agency costs at their portfolio firms,259 and those 
efficiencies would likely not be achievable if institutional investors were fully 
passive.260 
In the end, then, condemning mere common ownership is likely to generate 
significant costs, either in the form of decision costs (if institutional investors 
continue to invest in competing firms and to vote their shares), error costs (if 
such investors respond to potential liability by refraining from intra-industry di-
versification or remaining fully passive at their portfolio firms), or both. It hardly 
seems wise to embrace a liability rule that would generate these predictable costs 
to achieve only speculative marginal benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Mere common ownership—horizontal shareholding involving no effort to 
coordinate portfolio firms’ behavior or exercise management control and no 
ownership of control-conferring stakes—does not violate the U.S. antitrust laws. 
                                                                                                                           
 257 See THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 10 (2018) 
(defining “error costs”). The losses here would be Type I error costs—welfare reductions from wrong-
ly condemning efficient conduct. The welfare losses from failing to prevent anticompetitive instances 
of common ownership would be Type II error costs. The discussion in the text treats avoidance of 
Type II error costs as a marginal benefit of condemning mere common ownership. 
 258 Cf. Posner et al., Proposal, supra note 6, at 712 (proposing an antitrust safe harbor for intra-
industry diversified institutional investors who remain purely passive, as described). 
 259 See generally Jarrad Harford, Ambrus Kecskés & Sattar Mansi, Do Long-Term Investors Im-
prove Corporate Decision Making?, 50 J. CORP. FIN. 424 (2018) (examining large panel of firm year 
comprising around 3,000 firms annually over a near thirty-year period). Jarrad Harford, Ambrus 
Kecskés, and Sattar Mansi concluded that long-term investment by active institutional investors en-
hanced quality of corporate management, reduced measurable instances of managerial misbehavior, 
boosted innovation, decreased debt maturity (causing firms to become more exposed to financial mar-
ket discipline), and increased shareholder returns. Id. 
 260 See Lambert & Sykuta, supra note 29, at 264–69. 
2020] Common Ownership and Antitrust 2963 
Such ownership is immune from liability under Section 7 of the Clayton Act be-
cause of the solely-for-investment exemption. It does not violate Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act because it does not involve the sort of contract, combination, or 
conspiracy that is required for liability under that provision. 
This is a good thing. Condemning mere common ownership under Section 
7 or Section 1 would either deny investors access to valuable investment prod-
ucts (if institutional investors were to forego intra-industry diversification) or 
increase corporate agency costs (if institutional investors opted to continue intra-
industry diversification but remain completely passive in the industries that they 
were diversified in). In contrast to these likely and significant marginal costs, the 
marginal benefits of condemning mere common ownership are, on the current 
empirical record, speculative. The studies purporting to show anticompetitive 
harm from common ownership suffer from methodological difficulties, and sub-
sequent studies contradict them. Because they fail to segregate mere common 
ownership from instances of common ownership accompanied by anticompeti-
tive agreements, they likely overstate the harms from, and thus the benefits of 
prohibiting, common ownership simpliciter. On the current empirical record, 
then, courts and antitrust enforcers should resist calls to expand the prohibitions 
of Sections 7 and 1 to condemn mere common ownership. 
 
 
  
 
